China has got another patriotic box office hit this National Day holiday. ‘Home Coming’ (万里归途) is inspired by China’s overseas citizens protection response during the 2011 Libya crisis, and is sparking waves of nationalistic sentiments.
On October 1st, China’s National Day, the Chinese movie Home Coming (万里归途) became a trending topic on Chinese social media after its cinema debut on September 30. On Saturday, the movie’s box office sales hit 200 million yuan ($28 million) (#万里归途票房破2亿#).
The National Day holiday, which started on Saturday, is a common time for Chinese domestic movies – often patriotic ones – to hit the theaters. It is one of the most profitable times of the year for Chinese cinemas and also the time when the biggest domestically-produced films are boosted while Hollywood movies are limited.
The 2022 Home Coming war drama was directed by Rao Xiaozhi (饶晓志) and features major Chinese actors such as Zhang Yi (张译), Wang Junkai (王俊凯) and Yin Tao (殷桃).
The film tells the story of Chinese diplomats Zong Dawei (大伟与) and Cheng Lang (成朗), who are ordered to assist in the evacuation of overseas Chinese when war breaks out in North Africa in 2011. Just when they think they’ve successfully completed their mission, they learn they have to return to save a group of 125 compatriots who are still left behind.
The movie is said to be based on real events but it is set in the fictional Numia Republic (努米亚共和国). According to Chinese state media outlet China.org, Home Coming is inspired by an evacuation event in Libya in 2011, when the Chinese embassy reportedly evacuated more than 30,000 Chinese nationals in a time frame of 12 days.
At the time, Chinese official media called it “the largest such operation China had mounted abroad since the Nationalists fled in 1949” and Chinese nationals were evacuated from the war-torn Libya via land, sea, and air (Zerba 2015, 107).
On Weibo, there are many reviewers giving Home Coming a five-star rating, with some saying the movie moved them to tears. “I needed four tissues,” one movie-goer said, while another person complained that they forgot to bring any tissues to dry their tears. In light of the movie’s premiere, photos of people crying while watching the film also circulated online.
Although there were also a lot of fans who especially loved the role played by the super popular Wang Junkai, many movie-goers expressed pride in China after watching the movie, which revolves around the idea of finding one’s way back home – back to China.
Although Home Coming is said to be the first film about a Chinese foreign evacuation from a diplomat’s perspective, there have been multiple domestic movies over the past decade focusing on Chinese civilians needing to be rescued from chaos erupting abroad.
In Operation Red Sea (红海行动, 2018), which also stars Zhang Yi, a Chinese special task force sets out on a risky mission to evacuate civilians amid civil war in the fictional ‘Republic of Ihwea’ – loosely based on the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Yemen in 2015.
At the end of the Home Coming movie, a text showed up on the screen to remind Chinese viewers to always get in touch with the Foreign Ministry hotline for assistance if they find themselves in an emergency situation while abroad.
Chinese movie star Wu Jing (吴京) also makes a cameo appearance in this film. Wu is most famous for his role in Wolf Warrior 2, in which he plays a special forces soldier who battles foreign mercenaries and helps Chinese and African citizens during a local war in Africa.
“My love for my country reached a new height after seeing this film,” one person wrote, with others applauding the efforts of Chinese diplomats and saying they were so happy be a Chinese national.
While Home Coming was trending on Chinese social media, last year’s patriotic hit film also went trending at the same time (#长津湖首播收视率第一#): Battle at Lake Changjin was aired on TV for the first time by CCTV-6 on the evening of October 1st. To read more about why that movie became such a major success, check out our article here.
Zerba, Shaio H. 2015. “China’s Libya Evacuation Operation: a new diplomatic imperative – overseas citizen protection.” In Suisheng Zhao (ed), China in Africa: Strategic Motives and Economic Interests, p 100-120.
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Although a new article about the future of China’s zero Covid policy by Chinese official newspaper People’s Daily is receiving a lot of attention on Chinese social media, the topic is heavily censored and thousands of comments have been taken offline.
On October 11, Chinese Party newspaper People’s Daily (人民日报) published an article titled “Dynamic Zero Is Sustainable and Must Be Adhered To” (“动态清零”可持续而且必须坚持).
The article stresses that although the epidemic poses a real challenge, China must stick to its ‘zero Covid strategy,’ which is all about the speedy detection of new cases, followed by a quick response to curb the spread of the virus immediately. The article says:
“We must be realistic and see that China is a large country with a population of more than 1.4 billion people, where there is uneven regional development and not enough medical resources. Loosening our prevention & control measures will certainly lead to an increased risk of infection, and once the scale bounces out of control, the spread of the epidemic is bound to cause a serious impact on economic and social development. Ultimately, we would pay a higher price and our loss will be greater. Sticking to the dynamic zero strategy provides us with a better balance between epidemic prevention & control and economic and social development; allowing us to achieve the biggest efficiency of prevention & control at minimal cost, while minimizing the big impact of the epidemic on economic and social development. “
The author of the article is “Zhong Yin” (仲音). Previous articles published by the Party newspaper relating to China’s epidemic policy and stressing that dynamic zero is the best option were also attributed to Zhong Yin.
“Zhong Yin is the central government voice,” one commenter suggested, with the name sounding similar to the words for ‘central government’ (“仲音..中央的音”).
People’s Daily has since long used homophonous pen names to transmit official Chinese Communist Party views (read more here).
The article comes at a time when discussions on the future of China’s zero Covid strategy are intensifying while various cities and regions are stepping up their zero Covid game.
Since there is uncertainty among the people about how long they will have to deal with Health Code systems, unexpected lockdowns, travel restrictions, mandatory quarantines, etc., any official publication relating to the potential future of China’s Covid strategy inescapably receives a lot of attention.
In June of 2022, an official Chinese media report introduced Beijing’s epidemic prevention strategy as continuing for “the coming five years” (“未来五年”). Those four words then flooded social media and caused commotion among netizens who interpreted this as a sign that China’s current Covid strategy would continue at least five more years. Although the media outlet’s editor-in-chief soon responded and blamed reporters for getting it all mixed up, many netizens were confused and wrote that the idea of living with the current measures for so many years shocked and scared them.
The current article by People’s Daily has also been shared many times on social media platform Weibo, where one hashtag dedicated to the topic received over 240 million views on Tuesday (#动态清零可持续而且必须坚持#).
Although one post featuring the article received over 18,000 likes and approximately 1500 comments, not a single one of them was visible at time of writing.
The official People’s Daily account also published the post but did not allow people to comment on it at all.
One Weibo user joked: “Ah, is this what they mean with ‘dynamic zero’?”
Chinese media outlet The Observer (观察者网) posted about the topic, but despite Weibo showing that there were over 1800 replies, none of these reactions were visible. Clicking on the discussion thread only showed a notification saying: “Sorry, this content is temporarily unavailable.”
The same goes for a Sohu News post, which showed that there were over 1000 replies but none were visible.
The strict control of online discussions on this topic led to increasing confusion. One person wondered: “Does this [article] represent the official central government stance, or is it an assumption by People’s Daily?”
“Reading this kind of news just makes me despair,” another person wrote.
“The key is the absurdity of the epidemic prevention measures across the country now, people can’t stand it. If we’d just stick to scientific prevention measures everyone would be ok with it.”
Another Weibo user wondered: “Could People’s Daily open up its comment section, or are they to afraid to do so?”
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A science blogger liking a sexy selfie, a marketing livestream showing pretty ladies dancing around in tight clothes. Sexual objectification of women or much ado about nothing?
This week, the popular WeChat account Brother News (新闻哥) published an article authored by ‘Sister News’ (新闻妹) addressing two recent controversial hot topics on Chinese social media related to attractive, busty young women.
According to the author, two parties have “unjustly” been smeared for their appreciation of beautiful women: the first is a science blogger, and the second is a coconut water brand.
Slammed for Liking a Hot Girl Pic
Xiao Liang (小亮) is a Chinese blogger focused on science and biology who got caught up in controversy this week for liking a photo showing an attractive, well-proportioned woman.
Xiao Liang has over 6,4 million fans on his Weibo account and his fans apparently take great interest in his online activities as some of them ‘exposed’ how Xiao Liang had liked () this selfie post by a female fitness blogger.
The photos ‘liked’ by Xiao Liang.
Some people commented that it was distasteful or even vulgar for a well-known science blogger to like such photos of a hot girl, especially as a married man with children. Other expressed disappointment because this behavior did not meet their expectations of him.
On October 9, Xiao Liang responded to the controversy in a post, claiming that he unintentionally had pressed the ‘like’ button for these particular photos but also saying that he does not see what would be wrong about liking a photo of a beautiful woman.
The female whose photos were liked by Xiao Liang also hinted at the controversy in one of her recent posts. “Share beauty,” she wrote: “It’s ok to appreciate beauty.”
Coconut Palm Controversy
During the National Day holiday, there was also some commotion over a series of promotional live streams on video platform Douyin by Chinese popular coconut milk brand Coconut Palm (椰树椰汁).
Coconut Palm’s live stream featured several attractive, busty women in tight tops and shorts dancing in front of the camera. The stream was cut off multiple times by Douyin (#椰树集团直播带货风格引争议#).
As reported by South China Morning Post, Coconut Palm has been fined twice before by local authorities for advertisements and packaging suggesting its product could promote breast enlargement.
Its whole marketing strategy revolves around attractive people and busty women, and its ambassador slogan is something along the lines of “I grew up by drinking it since I was little,” but in between the lines this could also suggest “I got big [breasts] by drinking it since I was little” (#我从小喝到大#).
Both issues have triggered discussions on Chinese social media about feminine aesthetics in online culture today.
There are two sides on this discussion; there are those who criticize the objectification of women and say that it is all about the ‘male gaze’ in media culture, meaning that women are intentionally portrayed in a certain way to attract the attention of men.
But there are also many others who think people should mind their own business and should not criticize others for something as simple as appreciating a beautiful shape.
Brother News pointed out that Coconut Palm also featured attractive men in its advertising campaigns: “What’s wrong with looking at beautiful women and men on the Internet? We want to see them! We want to see them!
The author of the Brother News article also wonders what it actually means when people get slammed for liking beautiful women, and asks what this says about the women themselves: are they not considered ‘good women’ because of how they look? Is it an actual criticism of men’s behavior or is this more about female rivalry?
Some think people have lost their sense of humor. “I just think it’s funny, both the Xiao Liang thing and the Coconut Palm issue.”
Others wrote: “I like that drink and I like looking at pretty women, I don’t see a problem with it.”
“Some netizens complain about online control, while they are the ones who are even more controlling,” one person commented.
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As China’s 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is around the corner, hashtags and online posters about the upcoming major political event are already dominating Chinese social media.
Among those is People’s Daily‘s “Hello, 20th Party Congress” (#你好二十大#), a hashtag that is used to explain the basics surrounding the Party Congress that will start on October 16, 10:00, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Instead of using one centralized hashtag, various official media are using different hashtags to promote their own reports about the Party Congress. The People’s Liberation Army Daily (解放军报), for example, uses the “Welcome to the 20th National Congress” (#喜迎二十大#) hashtag while Communist Youth League uses their own “The Youth is Watching 20th Party Congress” (#青年看二十大#) hashtag.
China’s Party Congress (中国共产党全国代表大会, commonly called 党代会 dǎngdàihuì in Chinese), is held every five years and this is the moment when key decisions for China are discussed and officially announced.
At the last Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping was formally granted a second term, and he also held a three-and-a-half-hour speech on “Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (新时代中国特色社会主义思想) in front of on a podium before 2300 delegates, presenting the Party’s new concepts, thoughts and strategies.
Since the 19th Party Congress was all about China’s “New Era,” the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party is now presented as one that takes place at a critical moment that determines the direction of this new road to China’s ‘rejuvenation.’
At this year’s event, Xi Jinping is expected to secure his third five-year term. In March of 2018, a constitutional amendment that allows Xi Jinping to rule beyond 2023 was passed.
One infographic shared by People’s Daily gives an overview of the growing number of representatives at the Party congresses from 1921 to the present.
At the time of the first congress in Shanghai and Jiaxing in 1921, the Communist Party only had around 50 members. A year later, the newly-established Party held its second Congress in Shanghai attended by 12 representatives, representing 195 members of the Chinese Communist Party. Now, a century later, 2296 delegates will represent over 96 million members of the Chinese Communist Party.
Another related hashtag initiated by People’s Daily on Weibo is the 20th Party Congress Vlog (#二十大代表vlog#), presenting delegates through video.
One of them is Na Bao (娜保) from the Yunnan Lahu ethnic group; she is one of the female delegates and is a local traditional musician.
Communist Party congress delegates include ethnic minorities, farmers, and ‘model’ workers, and various of them are highlighted in videos and interviews and promoted on Chinese social media (#二十大代表风采#).
Besides highlighting the congress delegates, the image of Xi Jinping as a leader of the people is also pushed by official media, with Xi’s slogan “ready to give up the self to serve the people” (“我将无我，不负人民”) being reiterated by Global Times and People’s Daily.
In light of the upcoming congress, China Post will issue special commemorative stamps and a souvenir set on October 16. The stamps are titled “Striving for a New Journey” (奋进新征程) and “Building a New Era” (建功新时代) (#二十大纪念邮票10月16日发行#).
Special stamp issued for the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.
It is clear that social media and online state media channels are in full ‘Party mode’. As around every major political event in China, this means that state media and government social media accounts are focused on disseminating the official propaganda surrounding the event, including videos, interviews, infographics, images, slogans, articles, and songs.
At the same time, social media users are also experiencing a stricter control on information flows; despite official media reports about the upcoming Party Congress flooding Weibo, the discussions surrounding the event are severely limited. Even the posts about the special stamps had their comment sections closed.
On Thursday, just two days before the congress, two protest banners denouncing Xi Jinping and China’s zero Covid policy appeared at the Sitong Bridge in Beijing before being removed. Any mention of the incident was quickly censored on Chinese social media. WeChat users who mentioned the Sitong Bridge incident saw their accounts blocked and Wechat groups were shut down for discussing the protest.
Please check in with us again this week as we will keep an eye on social media trends surrounding the event. Don’t forget to subscribe. For previous posts on the Party Congress, check here.
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What are the key terms and concepts mentioned in Xi Jinping’s speech that are propagated all over Chinese social media this week? Here, we explain ten important concepts and keywords that you are probably going to see much more of in the coming five years.
It is the week of the 20th CPC National Congress, China’s quinquennial major political event that is all about discussing and deciding on important Party issues, appointing Party leadership and officially announcing new governance concepts, thoughts and strategies proposed by the CPC Central Committee.
The Party Congress opened on Sunday, October 16, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered his nearly two-hour-long speech reflecting on the recent past and the future of the Communist Party and the country at large, signalling the direction China will be heading.
In our earlier article covering Xi Jinping’s speech, we focused on how Chinese official channels turned parts of the work report into hashtags that were promoted on social media and then became trending topics.
Here, we will go over some of the terms and words that were used in the political report delivered by Xi and were propagated on Chinese social media as ‘key terms’ through general hashtags such as “Understanding These Key Terms from the 20th Party Congress Report,” “Studying the Essence of the 20th Party Congress” or “The New Era and Journey of the 20th Party Congress” (#看懂二十大报告中这些关键词#, #学习二十大精神#, #党的二十大新时代新征程#).
During the 19th CPC National Congress in 2017, Party newspaper People’s Daily published a vocabulary list containing 100 relevant words and terms. That list included terms such as “5G Era” (5G时代), “Sharing Economy” (分享经济), “The 20th anniversary of Hong-Kong’s return to China” (香港回归祖国20周年), “Made in China 2025” (中国制造2025), and other key terms that were deemed relevant in 2017 for China’s nearing future.
This Congress, there has not been a comparable official vocabulary list, but there have been various shorter lists and hashtags encouraging netizens to study key terms that are important to this year’s Congress and the Party goals. Many of these terms are visualized in infographics or explained in online posts and articles.
We’ve gathered some of these key terms from Xi’s speech here that are important to understand, not just for the fact that they are mentioned in Xi’s speech but also because they are specifically highlighted by various official channels.
1. Modernizing the Chinese Way 中国式现代化
This concept was mentioned at least five times throughout Xi Jinping’s address and it is one of most important themes of this Party Congress: “Chinese modernization” or “Chinese-style modernization” (中国式现代化 Zhōngguóshì xiàndàihuà).
While the 19th Party Congress was all about China’s ‘new era’ (新时代), this 20th Party Congress term grasps the idea of further modernizing the country in a ‘Chinese way,’ meaning a type of modernization in which typically Chinese features and characteristics (“中国特色”) are maintained.
This is a relatively new term. A tool that shows searches on the Chinese search engine Baidu indicates that it did not receive any significant amount of searches before spiking during the week 20th Party Congress.
Baidu trend search shows that the term “Chinese-style modernizarion” “中国式现代化” did not receive any significant searches before October 2022.
The concept, however, did pop up in Chinese official media discourse since late 2021, such as in one article published by Xinhua News on September 27 in 2021 titled “Grasping the Main Features of the New Path of Chinese-Style Modernization” (把握中国式现代化新道路的主要特征)
The idea of Chinese-style modernization is closely related to other key concepts such as “common prosperity for all” (全体人民共同富裕 quántǐ rénmín gòngtóng fùyù) and “harmony between humanity and nature” (人与自然和谐共生 rén yǔ zìrán héxié gòngshēng).
2. The Central Mission 中心任务
The term “central mission” (中心任务 zhōngxīn rènwù) was mentioned at least once in Xi Jinping’s address to convey how the central task of the CPC is to “unite and lead the people of all nationalities to build a strong socialist modern country,” and to “promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with Chinese-style modernization.”
Although the term “central mission” itself is not particularly tied to the 20th Party Congress at all, it is now because of how it is being used in the new context of the Party’s ‘main goal’ in China’s ‘new era.’ People’s Daily also promoted a hashtag including this term: “The Communist Party of China’s Central Task from Now On” (#从现在起中国共产党的中心任务#”).
3. Top Priority 第一要务
The key term ‘top priority’ (第一要务 dì yī yàowù) refers to the Party pursuing the kind of “high-quality development” (“高质量发展”) that will lead to the further modernization of the country.
“High-quality development” was also mentioned in the 19th Party Congress report in 2017 to indicate a shift and a new phase in China’s economic development from a focus on high-speed growth to a focus on more high-quality development, which is also outlined in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025).
This means, among others, that there will be more focus on innovation-driven industries and technological advancement.
4. The “Two-Steps” Strategy “两步走”战略安排
In the segment of Xi’s speech where he addresses China-style modernization in the new era, he also mentions the “two steps” strategy (“两步走”战略安排 “liǎng bù zǒu” zhànlüè ānpái). This is not a new term and it has been previously introduced as part of China’s journey to becoming a strong, rejuvenated country – making China great again.
The two steps of this strategy are to realize ‘socialist modernization’ by 2035 and then to enter the next phase from 2035-2050 to build China into a “strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious and beautiful socialist modernization country.” The year 2049 will mark the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, and this is the moment when China’s “great rejuvenation” should be completed.
5. The Road to Follow 必由之路
At the end of Xi Jinping’s speech, he mentioned “the road to follow” (必由之路, bìyóuzhīlù) five times. On social media, the “road to follow” has been reiterated multiple times as well by official channels, including in a propaganda video published by CCTV.
The five ‘roads to follow’ mentioned in the Party Congress and in the state media videos are the following that are together presented as “the only road” the country and the Party must take. They are all linked together and are actually somewhat circular, namely:
– to develop socialism with Chinese characteristics, they must adhere to the overall leadership of the Party
– to achieve the “great rejuvenation” of China they must stick to socialism with Chinese characterics
– to reach this historic undertaking, they must be united in struggle
– to allow China to grow and develop in the ‘new era,’ they must implement the new concepts for development
– to be able to take this new road together & keep the Party full of vitality, they must follow the way of comprehensive and strict Party governance
6. Building Beautiful China 建设美丽中国
In the 20th CPC National Congress report, the idea of “building beautiful China” (建设美丽中国, jiànshè měilì Zhōngguó) was mentioned in the segment dedicated to the “green development” of China as part of its overall modernization. This includes environmental protection, pollution control, carbon reduction, and climate change awareness.
‘Beautiful China’ as a concept was first introduced during the 18th Party Congress in November of 2012 as part of China’s long-term environmental protection plan within the context of people’s welfare and the future of China.
7. Whole-process People’s Democracy 全过程人民民主
This concept of ‘whole-process people’s democracy’ (全过程人民民主, quán guòchéng rénmín mínzhǔ) is mentioned at least five times in Xi Jinping’s 20th Party Congress speech and it is one of the political concepts and terms proposed by Xi himself as part of Xi Jinping’s Socialist Thought with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. It was mentioned in the speech Xi gave during the celebration of the Party’s 100-year anniversary in 2021.
This so-called ‘whole-process people’s democracy’ is officially presented as a ‘process-oriented’ democracy that, despite being different from Western democracy, supposedly “covers all aspects of the democratic process and all sectors of society” through a combination of elections, consultations, decision-making, management and oversight.
This idea of China having its own particular kind of democracy – or perhaps having invented a Chinese version of what ‘democracy’ actually means – also suits the idea of Chinese-style modernization, in which China’s path to the future will not be like the route Western countries are taking, but instead combining modernization with Chinese features.
8. Socialist Culture 社会主义文化
‘Socialist Culture’ (社会主义文化, shèhuì zhǔyì wénhuà) comes up at least four times in the 20th Party Congress report. The term represents a cultural side of China’s modernization, and emphasizes that, in order to build a strong socialist country, there must also be a strong socialist culture.
Although not explicitly stated, official media propaganda inescapably plays an important part in the cultivation of a strong ‘socialist culture’ that is all about cultural self-confidence, cultural innovation, creativity, and ‘spiritual energy.’
At time of writing, the Baidu Trends tool did not have enough information to show any relevant data on the search engine interest in this particular term, but the idea of ‘socialist culture’ is by no means a new one. “Socialist culture with Chinese characteristics” was already proposed by Jiang Zemin (江泽民) at the 15th CPC National Congress in 1997.
The idea that building a strong socialist culture is important for the further development of China has been further cultivated over the past few years under Xi’s leadership. Also read this article in English titled “How to build a strong socialist culture” in Qiushi, the CPC Central Committee bimonthly.
9. Improve the Distribution System 完善分配制度
This phrase comes up once in the part of the 20th Party System report that disusses a fairer economic system with more equal employment & income opportunities and regulated wealth accumulation, encouraging hard work to get rich.
Although it is the first time that a regulation of wealth accumulation has come up in this way (and it is not explained what this actually means), the idea behind these concepts of the distribution system and wealth accumulation standardization is that of ‘common prosperity,’ one of the most important concepts guiding China’s recent policymaking.
‘Improve the distribution system’ (完善分配制度, wánshàn fēnpèi zhìdù) was explicilty mentioned as one of the key concepts for this week’s meeting by various channels, but it mainly is ‘the regulation of wealth accumulation’ that is featured in social media hashtags (#中国将规范财富积累机制#).
10. Focus 着力点
Many of the words or phrases propagated as ‘key terms’ for this 20th Party Congress are insignificant by themselves but are merely used to represent a bigger body of thoughts. The aforementioned “Top Priority,” “Central Mission,” and “Road to Follow” are all just words that only mean something within the context of Xi Jinping’s speech.
Another example is “Major Principles” (“重大原则” zhòngdà yuánzé) which is also included by CCTV in this list of most important keywords, but which actually just goes back to the same ideas that are referred to in the other terms, namely strengthing the overall leadership of the Party, adhering to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, emphasizing people-centered ideology, etc. – which is similar to the idea behind the “Road to Follow” (必由之路) keyword.
Explanation of ‘Major Principle’ concept in English and Chinese by People’s Daily, posted on Weibo.
Then there is the keyword “focus,” 着力点 (zhuólìdiǎn), which is about the focus of China’s economic development.
In China’s coming years, the economic focus should be placed on the real economy (实体经济). This literally is also a hashtag promoted on Weibo by CCTV this week (“Put the Focus of Economic Development on the Real Economy” #把发展经济的着力点放在实体经济上#).
Different from the Financial Economy, the Real Economy is the realm of economy that is about businesses, production, and the direct exchange/purchase of goods or services.
Also part of this ‘focus’ is China’s new industrialization, manufacturing, product quality, aerospace, transportation, new technology, and digital China. Another related term that is proposed as one of the keywords of this Party Congress is ‘innovation’ (创新, chuàngxīn).
Please check in with us again this week as we will keep an eye on social media trends surrounding the CPC National Congress. Don’t forget to subscribe. For previous posts on the Party Congress, check here.
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Images via Weibo account of Communist Youth League, CCTV, and People’s Daily.
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Chinese leader Hu Jintao was unexpectedly led away by aides during the closing session of the 20th CPC National Congress. While there is much speculation in English-language media on the whys and hows regarding the incident, any mention of it has been scrubbed from the Chinese internet. China’s official evening news, however, made no attempts to hide the empty chair next to Xi Jinping.
It is an eventful Saturday as the 20th CPC National Congress concluded and the Communist Party elected a new Central Committee. The official name list was also released through Chinese online media channels on the morning of October 22.
There are a few issues regarding the 20th Party Congress that have triggered discussions on Twitter today. One of them is the seemingly premature retirement of China’s Premier Li Keqiang (李克强), as his name was left off the new Party Central Committee members list.
Li Keqiang’s name came up with zero new results on social media platform Weibo on Saturday, despite the Central Committee name list being top trending (#二十届中央委员会委员名单#). Before the end of the afternoon, China time, the topic had already received over 120 million views on Weibo.
But the most noteworthy incident of the day occurred shortly after 11 am, when former Chinese leader Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) was seen escorted out of the Party Congress.
The incident happened after reporters had been let into the hall and when voting on the Central Committee was completed. The meeting still went on after he left.
Hu Jintao is Xi Jinping’s immediate predecessor and was president from 2003 to 2013. On Saturday morning, he was seated next to Xi Jinping.
Former Chinese leader Hu Jintao mysteriously escorted out of the Great Hall of the People ahead of an expected speech by President Xi at the end of the CCP's Party Congress pic.twitter.com/3sCvdMIfhb
As Hu Jintao was led away, he seemed reluctant to go and also seemed to pause to say something to Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang on the way out (see the video here).
Was it a health-related issue? Was it a political move? Was it planned or not? Some on Twitter said Hu Jintao did not look well and mentioned his frail health, others had no doubts it was a display of power.
With a lack of official statements about the issue, there could be all kinds of possible reasons why Hu might have been escorted out this way.
CNN wrote that its channel was censored on air in China when reporting on Hu’s exit from the meeting Saturday. This led some on Twitter, including the Chinese author Cao Changqing, to conclude that Hu’s incident was not a medical issue, or else the footage would not have been banned.
But CNN segments are censored more often in China and regardless if the Hu incident is related to medical issues or not, it is bound to be delicate. The Party Congress is a particularly sensitive time for Beijing, and news narratives that reach people within China are always tightly controlled, especially when they affect the representation of the Party in any way.
Zero visible mentions of Hu Jintao on Weibo as of October 22. Last visible mention was on October 21 as part of a post on 'Today in Party History.'
While the unusual Hu incident was discussed all over Twitter, the name ‘Hu Jintao’ came up with zero new results on major Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo, Douyin, WeChat or Zhihu, although the 20th Party Congress itself was top trending on all of these platforms. This also made people speculate that the issue must have been political.
20th Party Congress top trending on Chinese Q&A platform Zhihu.com.
But it is important to note that virtually all Chinese social media posts about the 20th Party Congress are published by official media and government accounts. Critical discussions on the event itself, Party Congress decisions, or unexpected occurrences are always strictly regulated.
Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang do not show up in any new (within 24 hours) results on social media, but neither do top leaders such Li Zhanshu (栗战书), Wang Qishan (王岐山), or Han Zheng (韩正).
Although the lack of any mentions regarding Hu Jintao therefore might not be that noteworthy, it does show that, unsurprisingly, the incident has not been addressed by any official channels nor Chinese media bloggers and that individual posts, images, and videos about the incident are tightly censored. It is clear that Hu Jintao’s early departure is not something the Party wants to explain to Chinese audiences – in whatever context – at the time of writing.
On the evening of October 22, CCTV’s daily news program Xinwen Lianboaired a nearly 40-minute show about the 20th CPC National Congress Closing Session. The Evening News program also featured Hu Jintao next to Xi Jinping and later showed him casting his ballots.
While the program still shows Hu sitting next to Xi at the 7.30 mark, there is an empty seat next to Xi Jinping at the 7.50 mark.
Later on in the program, the empty seat is clearly visible multiple times. (See the short video below which we edited for the purpose of showing how Hu Jintao and his absence are shown in the official 40-min news program).
About the Hu Jintao incident and how it came up in the official state broadcaster's Evening News (Xinwen Lianbo): here is a short edit of the 40 min show showing that Hu is featured several times in first 7+ min, and how afterwards the empty chair is clearly visible besides Xi. pic.twitter.com/itjr9kHQim
Although Hu’s sudden absence, therefore, is clearly not secret or hidden in China, it is also not something that leaves room for discussion or speculation in Chinese online media spheres.
Despite the video being shared hundreds of times on Weibo, only a small selection of comments was allowed to appear underneath the Xinwen Lianbo video. “I wish the Motherland glory and prosperity,” one top comment said: “It’s only getting better.”
Update: A new tweet by the official state media outlet Xinhua claims that they learnt from one of their reporters that Hu was “not feeling well during the session,” leading to his staff “accompanying him to a room next to the meeting venue for a rest.” Xinhua writes: “Now, he is much better.” The statement was only posted in English language on Twitter, and similar statements were not posted on Weibo at the time of writing.
For more about the Party Congress, check our other articles here.
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Hundreds of Chinese state media and government channels posted a tribute to Mao Zedong’s oldest son on social media this week, commemorating the anniversary of his 100th birthday. The widespread publicity campaign shows a broader renewed focus on Mao Anying in Chinese online media, where official voices communicate why – and in which way – Mao Anying needs to be remembered by the Chinese people.
72 years after his death, Mao Anying is trending on Weibo. “Remembering Comrade Mao Anying’s 100th Birthday” became a popular hashtag on Weibo on October 24. Various official Chinese channels, including Global Times and the Communist Youth League, promoted the hashtag in their posts and included videos showing old footage featuring Mao Anying (毛岸英, 1922-1950), the first-born son of Mao Zedong and his second wife, Yang Kaihui.
“Let’s remember! In 1950 on November 25, at just 28 years old, Mao Anying sacrificed his life on the North Korean battlefield, Peng Dehuai called him the number one soldier of the volunteer army,” the Communist Youth League wrote on Weibo.
There has been a renewed focus on Mao Zedong’s son Mao Anying, who died on the Korean War battlefield at the age of 28 in 1950. A widespread online publicity campaign went trending this week, communicating why & how Mao Anying should be remembered. Read: https://t.co/rlRf2YxZWTpic.twitter.com/6SXTJbqc6M
During the Korean War, the Chinese government, led by Mao Zedong, sent troops to fight in the war, and Mao’s son Mao Anying joined the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army.
It is said that Chinese military leader Peng Dehuai did not want Mao Anying to join, thinking it was far too dangerous for him, but Mao allegedly disagreed: “Who will go if my son doesn’t?” (Davin, Ch. 4).
Mao Anying was killed in action by an American air strike a month after the start of this three-year war against US aggression in support of North Korea. He left behind his wife Liu Siqi (刘思齐), whom he had just married the year before his death.
Mao Anying with his wife Liu Siqi, who passed away in January of 2022 at the age of 92. #刘思齐同志逝世##毛岸英妻子刘思齐逝世#
Mao Anying’s short life was definitely not all roses. He was not in contact with his father for most of his younger years as Mao Zedong lost contact with his wife Yang Kaihui when little Anying was just around five years old.
Mao Anying had two brothers.* His younger brother Mao Anlong (毛岸龙, 1927-1931) died due to dysentery when he was still a toddler. A policeman badly beat his other brother Mao Anqing (毛岸青, 1924-2007) in the 1930s which is said to have contributed to him being diagnosed with schizophrenia later on in life.
In 1930, their mother was executed in Changsha by nationalist forces after allegedly refusing to denounce Mao and the Communist Party. After living on the streets in Shanghai for some years, Mao Anying and his brother Mao Anqing were located by the Party and sent to the Soviet Union to get an education (Davin 2013, Ch. 2).
Mao Anying became a Russian translator for Peng Dehuai during the Korean War and was placed at the Taeyudong headquarters in North Korea in the fall of 1950. As American bomb attacks started to come dangerously close to the headquarters, Mao Anying was made to go to a cave system that functioned as a bomb shelter but, for some reason, joined two others to a nearby hut the next day, which is where he was bombed.
After Mao Anying was killed, Mao Zedong allegedly said that “it was his misfortune to be Mao Zedong’s son” (Davin 2013, Ch. 4; Forbes 2010, 12).
In 1990, when staff was sorting through Mao Zedong’s belongings, they discovered that he had always kept a small collection of his son’s belongings with him: two neatly folded t-shirts, one pair of socks, a military cap, and a towel. This story was shared on social media by official channels on October 24 of 2021 (#毛泽东默默收藏多年的毛岸英遗物#).
The Forbidden Egg Fried Rice Meme
One part of Mao Anying’s death that has become an ongoing, urban-legend-kind-of online story is that he supposedly disobeyed army rules and cooked egg fried rice at the Chinese headquarters. The smoke of the fire supposedly alerted the enemy and led to the bombing in which he would lose his life.
Although losing his favorite son – and his potential successor – was a tragedy to Mao Zedong, some Chinese are less remorseful about the young Mao never making it home, arguing that he could have continued Mao Zedong’s ruthless reign after his death.
The anniversary of Mao Anying’s death has therefore come to be celebrated by some netizens as “Egg Fried Rice Day” (蛋炒饭节) or “Chinese Thanksgiving” (中国感恩节), since it’s close to the American Thanksgiving. China Digital Times has a ‘digital space’ page dedicated to the online protest and meme in one, writing that eating egg fried rice is one the day’s ‘traditions.’
A few years ago, the sensitive nature of this meme became clear when a Chinese celebrity chef with many social media followers uploaded a video on October 25 on how to prepare Yangzhou-style fried rice. As described by Dennis E. Yi (2020), the chef was accused of “humiliating China” due to the alleged – and probably unintentional – connection to the Mao Anying rumors.
Chef Wang (美食作家王刚) made fried rice on October 24, a sensitive dish for a sensitive day. Read more via The China Project.
In 2021, the social media account of a Jiangsu branch of China Unicom was shut down after it posted an egg fried rice recipe on October 24.
In the same year, China’s Cyberspace released an official list including “rumors and fake information” related to the history of the Communist Party of China, including “key facts on revolutionary leaders, heroes and historical events.”
This list was compiled and published in order to “establish a correct view of the history of the Party and oppose historical nihilism” (Global Times 2021). The claim that Mao Anying died because he exposed himself while he was preparing fried rice with eggs was included on this list and was officially declared a rumor.
When the Korean war-themed movie The Battle at Lake Changjin became a major hit in fall of 2021, one Weibo user wrote that “fried rice was the best thing to come out of the whole Korean War,” after which they were jailed for ten days for “impeaching the reputation of heroes and martyrs.”
“Why Do We Remember Mao Anying?”
The recent widespread state media campaign surrounding Mao Anying’s birthday is noteworthy. One Weibo post by Changjiang Daily (长江日报) says:
“He is Mao Zedong’s son, he is the first soldier of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, and he sacrificed his life with honor and glory on the North Korean battlefield. He is like his father and put his own flesh and blood into revolutionary work. His name was Mao Anying. Today, let us commemorate our comrade Mao Anying together.”
The same wording was also used in posts by other official channels, including by the Chinese police force, Wuhan City, Guangdong City, Ningxia, Nanchong Public Security, and many, many others.
State media outlet People’s Daily promoted the hashtag “Mao Anying Was the First Volunteer Soldier of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army” (#毛岸英是中国人民志愿军第一个志愿兵#), with other hashtags surrounding the commemoration of his birthday also circulating on Chinese social media, including “Why Do We Remember Mao Anying” (#我们为何纪念毛岸英#) and “Commemorating the 100th Birthday of Mao Anying” (#纪念毛岸英同志诞辰百年#).
The commemoration of Mao Anying’s 100th birthday went trending right after the ending of the 20th Party Congress and comes at a time when there is a renewed focus on remembering the Korean War (1950-1953).
The Korean War, referred to as ‘the War to Resist America and Aid Korea’ (抗美援朝战争), has become an important and recurring theme in multiple Chinese film productions, series, museums, and political events in recent years.
The 2020 movie The Sacrifice (金刚川), starring ‘Wolf Warrior’ actor Wu Jing, depicts the Korean War from different perspectives and focuses on the heroic role of ordinary soldiers. An exhibition at the Chinese Military Museum about the “glorious course and great achievements of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army” opened in 2020 as part of the 70th anniversary of the start of the war. In 2021, the Cemetery for Martyrs of the Chinese People’s Volunteers held a burial ceremony for 109 Chinese soldiers whose remains were returned by South Korea after seven decades (Conrad 2020; GT 2021).
But what has made the most impact on Chinese audiences is the 2021 blockbuster film The Battle at Lake Changjin, which provides a Chinese perspective on the start of the Korean War and the lead-up and unfolding of the battle of Chosin Reservoir, a massive ground attack of the Chinese 9th Army Group against American forces. The Chinese attack at Chosin is remembered as a glorious victory and strategic success for turning around the war situation in Korea and leading to a withdrawal of most of the UN forces by late 1950.
The movie’s narrative and script recurringly underline why this particular historical event should not be forgotten by the Chinese people. In one of the film’s earlier scenes, Mao Zedong talks to military leader Peng Dehuai in the days leading up to China’s decision to send out troops to North Korea, saying:
“[Our] country is newly established and thousands of things are waiting to be done. If it’s for our current situation, I really don’t want to fight this war. But if it’s for the future, and the peaceful development of our country over a few decades or a century, we must fight this war. The foreigners look down on us. Pride can only be earned on the battlefield.”
It is a scene that is telling for the narrative the movie conveys about the Chosin battle and the war at large, during which the Chinese troops were severely underestimated by the well-equipped U.N. forces.
After the ‘Century of Humiliation,’ the time from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s during which China was attacked, weakened, and torn by foreign forces, the Korean War and Chosin battle showed that the military strength of the People’s Republic of China was a new force to be reckoned with. By showing this strength, China did not just save the North Korean regime but also defended its own borders and the nation’s prestige.
The determination and fighting spirit of the Chinese soldiers at Chosin as depicted in the movie – one impressive scene shows dozens of soldiers frozen into “ice sculptures” while still in battle posture – struck a chord with Chinese audiences.
As part of this ‘re-remembrance’ of the Korean War in China, Mao Anying has been placed more prominently in the media spotlight.
The award-winning Battle at Lake Changjing also includes a scene showing how Mao Anying expresses his wish to join the army. After Peng Dehuai shares his disagreement, Mao Zedong comes out and says: “Let him go.” (You can watch the scene including English subtitles here.)
Mao Anying in the Battle at Lake Chanjin, played by actor Huang Xuan.
Although there already was a Chinese 34-episode TV drama dedicated to Mao Anying in 2010, the same year in which a statue of him was revealed by the North Korean border, the series focused more on the “special bond between father and son” and Mao Anying’s marriage to Liu Siqi, as the script was also partly based on Liu’s memoirs (Beijing Entertainment News 2010; CNR 2010).
It was not until more recently that Mao Anying’s legacy was officially and explictly contextualized within the frame of the victorious Korean War, specifically emphasizing the sacrifice Mao Anying made for his country.
In 2020 and in 2021, official Chinese channels began to actively promote stories about Mao Anying and his legacy on social media. The Chinese Historical Research Institute published the hashtag “The 70th Anniversary of Mao Anying Sacrificing His Life” (#毛岸英牺牲70周年#) in 2020, the same year when Chinese media featured posts about the ‘egg fried rice’ stories being “pure fabrications” and the need to “restore historical truth about the sacrifice of the martyr Mao Anying,”
No more egg fried rice rumors surrounding Mao Anying’s legacy – image posted by Guanchazhe on Weibo in 2020.
People’s Daily, for example, launched the hashtag “Mao Anying Was Only 28 Years Old When He Sacrificed His Life” (#毛岸英牺牲时年仅28岁#) in 2021. In the same year, Communist Youth League promoted the hashtag “71 Years Since Mao Anying Sacrificed His Life” (#毛岸英牺牲71周年#) and that the hashtag “Martyr Mao Anying Sacrificed His Life 71 Years Ago” (#毛岸英烈士牺牲71周年#) was launched, along with the slogan “Mao Anying Was the First Soldier of the Chinese Volunteer Army” (#毛岸英是志愿军第一名战士#).
The increased interest in Mao Anying is also visible when looking up search query trends in the Chinese search engine Baidu via their Baidu Index tool. Over the past five years, there has been a gradual increase in people searching for the keyword ‘Mao Anying,’ with the absolute peak in popularity of the search engine coinciding with the release of the Battle at Lake Changjin film.
Screenshot of Baidu trend report, showing the frequence of search quary ‘Mao Anying’ on search engine Baidu from late October 2017 to late October 2022.
Baidu Index shows there is a correlation between the increased interest in the Korean War and the interest in Mao Anying.
The Baidu search engine tool also shows how there is a correlation between the terms ‘Korean War’ and ‘Mao Anying’, as they both see peaks in popularity at the same time (blue line is Mao, green line is Korean War).
Remembering Mao Anying, The Right Way at the Right Time
In remembering Mao Anying and incorporating his legacy into China’s collective memory in the context of the Korean War, several dynamics come together at the same time.
The ‘War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea’ or China’s overall participation in the Korean War is described as a “great victory” in fighting against the U.S. forces and as a “sound foundation” for China’s development as a newly established country “at a time when it was rather backward and in dire need of a full-scale reconstruction.” As state media outlet Global Times (2021) writes:
“This success ensured a peaceful development environment for China and secured the international prestige of the Chinese military through the war. The spirit of all young men and women who sacrificed for the country during the war was inherited.”
This specific kind of remembrance, in which Mao Anying plays a special role as “the first soldier to sacrifice his life,” comes at a time when Party ideology is strong, and is especially emphasized in the 2020-2022 period during important events such as the 70th anniversary of start of the Korean War, the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, and the 20th Party Congress.
In Xi Jinping’s thoughts on China’s New Era and the journey towards a rejuvenated nation, you see a more assertive China and more focus on the country’s military strength and Party ideology (also see here and here).
Within this context, Mao Anying’s sacrifice for China’s future during the Korean War is more important than even before, especially in light of escalating political tensions between the U.S. and China, accompanied by a rise of Chinese nationalism.
It is therefore perhaps no coincidence that all the aforementioned things, from the launch of the Battle at Lake Changjin film, to the new remembering of Mao Anying on social media and the official listing of Mao Anying-related rumors as fabrications, took place within the last two to three years.
It is the ‘right’ time to commemmorate Mao Anying for the ‘right’ reasons: not just because he was Mao Zedong’s son or Liu Siqi’s husband, but because he was a Party leader’s son who joined the Chinese Volunteer Army and dedicated his life to “defending the country, serving the people, and strengthening the army” (China Military Online 2021).
“I salute you, hero,” one recurring popular comment on Weibo says. “Remember every hero who worked for the happiness of people in a New China!”
“He was a hero of the people,” others write: “You will never be forgotten.”
* Besides having three sons with his second wife Yang Kaihui, Mao Zedong would go on to have three daughters and three sons with He Zizhen, of which most either died young or were separated from their parents, and one daughter with his fourth wife Jiang Qing.
References (other primary sources included in text through hyperlinks)
Beijing Entertainment News 北京娱乐信报. 2010. “TV Series “Mao Anying” comes to CCTV, focusing on the love between father and son [电视剧《毛岸英》登陆央视 聚焦父子情]” (In Chinese). 北京娱乐信报, October 18 https://yule.sohu.com/20101018/n275860939.shtml [Oct 27, 2022].
China Military Online. 2021. “Mao Anying, forging ahead courageously and against all odds.” China Military, June 29 http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2021special/2021-06/29/content_10056685.htm [Oct 27, 2022].
CNR (China National Radio) 中广网. 2010. “Liu Siqiu: The TV Series ‘Mao Anying’ Is My Gift to Him [刘思齐：电视剧《毛岸英》是我送岸英的礼物]” (In Chinese). 中广网, October 21 http://www.taiwan.cn/plzhx/zht/201010/t20101021_1569029.htm [Oct 27, 2022].
Conrad, Jennifer. 2020. “70 years on, how China sees the Korean War.” The China Project, Oct 14 https://thechinaproject.com/2020/10/14/70-years-on-how-china-sees-the-korean-war/ [Oct 27, 2022].
Davin, Delia. 2013. Mao: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Purchase here).
Forbes, Cameron. 2010. The Korean War – Australia in the Giants’ Playground. Sydney: MacMillan.
Global Times. 2021. “Sacrifices from CPC’s young heroes, past and present, continue to inspire new generations.” Global Times, July 8 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1228123.shtml [Oct 27, 2022].
Global Times. 2021. “China releases list of rumors on Party history, martyrs to fight historical nihilism.” Global Times, July 16 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1228819.shtml [Oct 27, 2022].
Global Times. 2021. “Remains of 109 Chinese People’s Volunteers soldiers return from South Korea to China.” Global Times, Sep 2 https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1233202.shtml [Oct 27, 2022].
Yi, Dennis E. 2020. “Fried rice backlash: Why Chinese internet users turned on a celebrity chef.” The China Project, November 11 https://thechinaproject.com/2020/11/11/fried-rice-backlash-why-chinese-internet-users-turned-on-a-celebrity-chef/ [Oct 27, 2022].
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Want Want – you probably know their rice crackers with the cute kid icon – is celebrating its 60th anniversary this year. How did this decades-old brand become all the rage recently in China? From Pelosi to pickles, there is more to it than nostalgia and its cute ‘Hot Kid’ alone.
Wang Wang (旺旺), better known as ‘Want Want’ in English, has become all the rage in China in recent months. In its September issue, the Chinese magazine China Marketing (销售与市场) listed Want Want as the number one brand on its marketing noticeboard hot brand list, referring to it as “‘Lonely Warrior’ Want Want” (‘孤勇者’旺旺).
The Want Want Group (旺旺集团) is the most well-known rice cracker maker in China and one of the largest food and beverage makers in the region.
Want Want is a brand that many Chinese millennials grew up with. The Taiwanese company behind Want Want has a history that dates back to 1962. After becoming the dominant rice cracker maker in Taiwan with a market share as high as 95%, founder Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍明) looked across the Strait and officially ventured into the mainland market in 1992.
Why is the Want Want brand still so popular in mainland China today? The brand’s success directly goes back to Tsai Eng-meng, who undeniably is a marketing genius with a peculiar style. The Want Want company icon, officially named Wang Zai (旺仔) in Chinese and ‘Hot Kid’ in English, was created in 1979 and depicts a kid with wide open arms and legs, rolling his eyes (fun fact: Hot Kid never looks straight at you).
With its catchy name and distinctive icon, Want Want soon became a household brand in China. Adding to the brand’s popularity are the many commercials throughout the years that show the brand’s style, standing out due to their simplicity and fun energy.
Some of these advertising campaigns have become part of the collective popular memory of Chinese millennials. On the Chinese video site Bilibili, old Want Want commercials bring up nostaligc feelings and still receive millions of views today (see this famous one, or see a collection of classic Want Want commercials on Bilibili here).
From one of Want Want’s iconic commercials.
Ingenious strategies brought great success to the company from the start and subsequently ushered in “the golden decade” for Want Want from 2004 to 2013, making Tsai the richest man in Taiwan for three consecutive years.
Apart from Want Want’s signature rice cracker products, products such as Hot Kid Milk (旺仔牛奶), Lonely God Potato Chips (浪味仙), and QQ Gummies (旺仔QQ糖) also became household names in the mainland.
However, facing more competition and failing to keep up with Chinese customers’ evolving consumption habits and preferences, Want Want was stuck in a bottleneck period and its sales slowed down after 2014. Its recent comeback and sudden social media success have everything to do with Nancy Pelosi’s controversial Taiwan visit in August of 2021.
A ‘GOOD’ TAIWANESE COMPANY
On July 28, Tsai Wang-Chia (蔡旺家), Tsai Eng-meng’s second son and Want Want’s Chief Operating Officer and executive director, posted three single words on his Weibo account (@Matt旺家): “YOU GO AWAY.”
The text was accompanied by a photo of an old witch, which just so happens to be the nickname Chinese netizens gave to Pelosi, and the timing of the post was right when reports about the U.S. House Speaker’s potential Taiwan visit were coming out. Want Want soon became a hot topic afterward.
People had already been paying more attention to Tsai Wang-chia’s Weibo account in light of the then-ongoing calls to boycott Taiwanese companies on Chinese social media following rumors regarding Pelosi’s controversial visit.
Someone claiming to be an employee at Want Want then posted on the popular Red (Xiaohongshu) app, defending Want Want for being a “good Taiwanese company,” asking people to “please don’t hurt us by mistake.” This triggered a public campaign of digging into Tsai’s previous posts, and netizens soon discovered that the Want Want executive director had published similar posts before.
In March of 2022, when a U.S. delegation visited Taiwan, Tsai bluntly posted: “The American pigs have arrived in Taiwan” (“美国猪到台湾了“).
Because of his consistent patriotic and pro-unification stance, coupled with a down-to-earth personality and plain-spoken style despite being an heir of a multibillion dollar family, Tsai Wang-chia soon won the hearts of millions of Chinese netizens.
Tsai Wang-Chia (蔡旺家) and ‘Hot Kid’ (旺仔)
The hype got so so big that people started claiming that the figure of Want Want, the iconic Hot Kid, was actually based on Tsai Wang-chia as a child – despite the fact that ‘Hot Kid’ was created in 1979 while Tsai Wang-Chia was born in 1984.
PATRIOTIC ‘PRESIDENT WANT’
Tsai’s pro-unification sentiments seem to run in the family. Want Want founder Tsai Eng-meng, who is also commonly referred to as ‘President Want’ (旺董), has long been a unification supporter. This is also reflected in his business empire, which includes the Want Want China Times Group (旺旺中时媒体集团) that owns dominant pan-Blue (pro-China) media outlets in Taiwan.
Various videos, which soon widely circulated online, also showed ‘President Want’ expressing gratitude for the “great market of the mainland” (“因为有大陆这个伟大的市场，才造就了我旺旺的今天”) and proudly declaring that all Want Want employees are “impressive and dignified Chinese people” (堂堂正正的中国人).
To the delight of many Chinese netizens, more events and incidents showing Want Want’s patriotic stance were brought to light one after another.
The company filed for IPO on the HK Stock Exchange in 2008 with the name “Want Want China Holdings Limited” (中国旺旺控股有限公司); its Want Want Hospital in Hunan (湖南旺旺医院) was among the first private institutions to send a medical aid team to Wuhan during the initial COVID outbreak in the city; in 2019, when a Taiwanese celebrity mockingly said on a local program that “mainlanders cannot afford to eat pickles”, its newspaper Want Daily (旺报) published a conspicuous headline on its August 18 frontpage saying “MAINLANDERS CAN AFFORD TO EAT PICKLES!” (“大陆人吃得起榨菜!”), noting on the side: “Taiwanese are Chinese. We are from the same country and therefore should support each other.” (“台湾人就是中国人. 我们都是同一国的，所以当然要相挺.”)
In early August of this year, Want Want soared to the top of Weibo’s trending list, and netizens swarmed its live stream channel on Taobao, vowing to “consume wildly” (“野性消费”) and “empty their stock” (“清空库存”) in support of the brand.
According to the Time Weekly (时代周报), a government-owned newspaper from Guangzhou, the number of viewers on the channel that day reached almost 100,000 – up to ten times more than what the channel usually received in viewers, – and sales of its online shop spiked as many new customers came in after following the trending hashtag.
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN
In contrast to Want Want’s fervent popularity in mainland China, the brand has become more controversial on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, especially in light of its ownership of multiple leading media outlets, with many expressing worries that its dominant position might impact press freedom.
In June of 2019, a predominantly young mass rallied against so-called “red media” (Taiwanese media in favor of Beijing), with Want Want-owned newspapers (China Times 中国时报 and Want Daily 旺报) and TV channels (China Television 中国电视公司 and CTiTV 中天电视台) being among the main targets.
The following month, the Financial Times published an article, quoting anonymous journalists working for these outlets, saying that their editorial managers took direct instructions from Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office, a claim that the Want Want China Times Group later responded to as “malicious slander.”
In late 2020, the Tsai Ing-wen administration stripped CTiTV of its broadcast license upon renewal out of concerns about editorial interference by President Want Tsai Eng-meng. Such a ruling was a first since the founding of Taiwan’s National Communications Commission in 2006, a government body that regulates the industry, and evoked opposition from the ‘Blue Camp’ and controversy among the public.
SUCCESSFUL ON ALL FRONTS
Despite receiving criticism in Taiwan, Want Want has continued its success in mainland China. This year, Want Want is celebrating the company’s 60th anniversary, as well as the 30th year anniversary of the opening of its first factory in mainland China.
China Marketing wrote about Want Want’s 2022 success that “consistency is key” in marketing. Not only did the brand stick with its original logo and traditional products such as rice crackers and its dairy drink, it has also focused on nostalgic or playful ad campaigns throughout the years (think of its successful slogan “You Want, I Want, Everyone Wants” “你旺、我旺、大家旺.”)
Want Want products for sale on Taobao.
At the same time, the company is not afraid to launch new products and stay active in the world of Chinese social media and e-commerce.
But what has really become an essential point in its regained success this year is the brand’s consistency in delivering a patriotic message through multiple channels that resonated with Chinese consumers at a time of deteriorating US-China relations and more focus on cross-strait relations.
Erke, the Chinese sportswear brand by Hongxing Erke Group (鸿星尔克), was also brought back into the limelight in 2021 after they donated 50 million yuan ($7.7 million) to the Henan flood efforts. When people found out that the relatively low-profile brand donated such a high amount of money to help the people in Henan despite its own losses, its online sales went through the roof – everyone wanted to support this generous ‘patriotic brand.’
While nationalistic consumer sentiments matter, being a ‘patriotic brand’ alone is not enough; it eventually is the combination of being consistent and authentic, delivering popular products, and having a strong marketing campaign. When it comes to the mainland market, Want Want tackled all fronts this year.
In October of 2022, Want Want celebrated China’s National Day by using drones to project netizens’ hopes and wishes for the future all over the Great Wall, including a projection of a giant Want Want drink (#旺旺把爱国刻进了DNA#).
For now, Want Want has practically made ‘loving China’ a part of its brand. Mixing rice crackers with some nationalism is turning out to be a recipe for success – at least in the mainland.
By Tucker Jiang, with contributions by Manya Koetse
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A hashtag titled “Taiwan Professor Urges People of Taiwan to Wake Up” appeared in Weibo’s top trending lists earlier this week, attracting over 180 million views (#台湾教授呼吁台湾人要觉醒#).
The professor in question is the Taiwanese professor Chang Ling-chen (张麟徵, Zhang Linzheng), a Political Science Emeritus Professor at the National Taiwan University who is well-known for her media commentary on current affairs.
In a video that has been disseminated on social media by the Communist Youth League and other official accounts, Chang says:
“The people of Taiwan need to wake up. Are Americans good to us? Taiwan is Chinese territory. So it needs to be defended, at all costs. The U.S. is using us as an instrument.”
She suggests that Taiwan should not want to be involved in a US proxy war with China, which will lead to people being killed on both sides of the straits (“and you are actually all Chinese”) while the US would stand by unharmed. Zhang also says:
“There are Chinese people on both sides of the strait. It is one family on both sides. What harm did “the 1992 Consensus” actually do to Taiwan? Does Taiwanese “independence” actually have any chance of success? Does the Tsai government actually have any countermeasures? No. This government is incapable of defending the people of Taiwan.”
Chang made her comments on October 27 during the Taiwan Citizen Congress Watch (CCW) conference, and specifically this part was highlighted and disseminated by official accounts on Chinese social media, where it triggered some discussions among academics and regular netizens.
One historical blogger (@西平郡御史) writes on Weibo: “If we start a war, the people of Taiwan will have nowhere to run to. They’d have to jump into the Taiwan Strait or the Pacific Ocean! This professor just delivered a simple truth: the people of Taiwan should carefully listen and reflect, and draw a lesson from what happened with Ukraine.”
“She’s a good professor, too bad she’s preaching to deaf ears,” another blogger wrote.
The current hashtag was mainly disseminated by social media accounts belonging to Chinese Communist Party and government bodies, such as local Communist Youth Leagues and regional official accounts. The hashtag and a video segment of Chang’s speech were also shared on Weibo by the Global Times media outlet.
“Professor Chang is right: it is getting harder and harder to make the Taiwan problem “right”, the situation is developing into a pessimistic direction. I hope the young people can also pay a bit more attention to international politic-related news besides focusing on their entertainment news and gaming,” one Beijing-based Weibo user said.
The Taiwan issue has been a recurring hot topic in trending lists on Weibo in 2022, especially since Nancy Pelosi’s controversial Taiwan trip and China’s ensuing military exercises followed by the 20th Party Congress, where Taiwan was also an important theme.
Last week, the hashtag “Resolving the Taiwan Issue is China’s Own Affair” (#解决台湾问题是中国人自己的事#) also popped up in Weibo’s top trending lists after Senior Colonel Tan Kefei (谭克非), spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, spoke about how American plans to expand US military assistance to Taiwan are interfering with “China’s internal affairs.” The hashtag received 790 million views on Weibo thus far, along with the hashtag “Japan Must Not Meddle in the Taiwan Issue” (#日方不得插手台湾问题#) which received over 120 million views.
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While China is seeing the worst Covid outbreak in months and resentment is rising over strict lockdowns and ‘excessive’ Covid measures, Chinese political pundits and opinion leaders are painting a rosy picture of the future of China’s ‘zero Covid’ policy.
It is the Start of Winter (立冬) and China is seeing a spike in Covid-19 cases across the country.
There currently are approximately 40,000 confirmed Covid cases in the mainland, with the biggest outbreaks taking place in Guangdong, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang.
At the same time, frustrations over strict lockdowns and excessive anti-epidemic measures have been building recently, and there has been a lot of anger over a lack of emergency medical care for people in isolation in, among others, Ruzhou, Lanzhou, and Hohhot.
On Monday, November 7, political commentator Hu Xijin (@胡锡进), who used to be the editor-in-chief of Global Times, commented on China’s ‘dynamic zero’ Covid policy. Hu does so more often – in September 2022 he also published a lengthy post about China’s epidemic prevention.
China’s zero Covid policy is all about the speedy detection of new cases, followed by a quick response to curb the spread of the virus immediately and bring the epidemic situation under control. Because it is an ongoing process, it is called ‘dynamic zero’ (动态清零), with cases being extinguished soon after they are detected and with the eventual goal of having zero new infections in society (社会面清零).
The former journalist Hu, whose posts and statements often go trending and influence public opinion, made a few noteworthy comments in his recent post.
Hu suggested that the strict lockdowns in some parts of China are just not sustainable and that cities should stop striving to reach complete elimination of Covid cases. Instead, he advocated for a more relaxed and local approach, but did point out that Chinese cities could perhaps get back to focusing on reaching “zero” cases in the summer of 2023 (“到了明年夏天，也许一些城市可以重新追求零感染”).
By adhering to a model where Chinese regions stay in complete control when it’s about the spread of the virus, China will have drastically fewer deaths than in the West and its ‘dynamic zero’ approach will be remembered as a historical, “world-renowned achievement,” according to Hu.
“If we can remain in overall control and can keep the number of deaths far lower than in the West (..) then our epidemic prevention will benefit all 1.4 billion Chinese people, and will shine throughout history!”
Early on in his post, Hu Xijin suggests that the goal of ‘zero Covid’ is not actually to reach zero cases, but to keep the Covid outbreak in China under control:
“The ‘dynamic zero’ [policy] is not really about pursuing zero infections at all times, it is about continuing to keep the epidemic situation under control. Reaching absolutely zero infections should not be the goal of every city for this winter; by summer of next year, some cities can perhaps again pursue to have zero infections, but it is not realistic for this winter season. Thoroughly eliminating an especially active virus would exceed the basic level management capabilities in the majority of cities and the situation in Urumqi, Zhengzhou, and other cities shows that even if you carry out strict and lengthy lockdowns, the virus still continues to spread throughout the community.”
Hu Xijin suggests that Beijing is the number one city in China when it comes to efficiently implementing Covid measures and responding to new cases. Yet, even Beijing is now seeing a spike in new cases, so Hu’s reasoning is that if Beijing can’t even reach ‘zero’ Covid, then no other city can.
If ‘zero’ Covid is impossible, Hu implies, cities might as well be a bit more relaxed in their epidemic approach because the socio-economic cost of doing city-wide or district-wide lockdowns is so high, while the effects might be relatively minimal: Covid will still find a way. Hu writes:
“Beijing hasn’t carried out a large-scale lockdown, and the economic and social life in the city has been the most relaxed of the nation. Lockdowns have all been done locally [small-scale], and as everyone saw, Beijing held its first marathon in three years yesterday. That’s another step forwards. When there are outbreaks in other cities, especially when cases are scattered, and cities want to reach ‘zero Covid,’ they can only do that through the method of wide-scale or even total static management. But even if it is done like that, it does not mean they can realize a total elimination of Covid cases this winter while the social and economic costs of pursuing a ‘zero Covid’ goal are actually too high. The reality across the country is that people are less and less willing to cooperate with area-wide static management [lockdowns]. Regardless of whether you look at it from the standpoint of public opinion or from that of the financial burden, it is not sustainable to go on like that.”
Hu suggests that focusing on keeping infection rates low is more effective than maintaining a ‘zero’ Covid policy. By focusing on lower numbers instead of zero cases, cities can keep the burden on social and economic life low, while also avoiding an epidemic crisis. This basically is what ‘dynamic zero’ is all about.
Anti-epidemic workers waving a Chinese flag, posted via @漫长岁月
In the conclusion of his post, Hu calls China’s epidemic prevention a “world-renowned success” that has saved the lives of millions of people over the past three years:
“Facing new circumstances, if we can maintain complete control, and can keep the number of deaths far lower than in the West while also safeguarding our economy and the order of social development, then our epidemic prevention – at every stage and in its entirety – and its achievements will benefit all 1.4 billion Chinese people, and will shine throughout history!“
Hu Xijin’s lengthy post and rose-colored outlook on the future of Covid zero received over 11,000 ‘likes’, but clearly did not impress all of his readers. Some replied: “So you’re basically just explaining the concept of the zero Covid policy again?” “Beijing the most relaxed?” others wondered.
“Stop wide-scale nucleic acid testing!” some said, with others replying: “We can’t continue to blindly follow the zero Covid policy.” “Listen to the voices of the people.”
Another commenter replied: “If we still want to be practical and realistic, we must admit that zero Covid is impossible, and we can’t pay such a high price to go on a mission that will never end. We should revise the general policy and insist on controlling the scale, protecting lives, and preventing hospitalization.”
Some who replied did agree with Hu’s words, writing: “A world-renowned success: it highlights the necessity of unswervingly insisting on ‘dynamic zero’!”
“What must we hold on to? The dynamic Zero Covid policy! Let the West lie flat, because the pandemic will have serious repercussions for them.”
Hu Xijin is not the only Chinese opinion maker who is describing the country’s zero Covid strategy as one that will go down in history as a glorious victory.
In late October, a short video went viral on Twitter showing a Chinese businessman giving a speech in which he claimed China would come out of the pandemic as the winner since the West would be brought to its knees because of the long-term impact of the pandemic. He explicitly mentioned long Covid and its supposed devastating effects on the labor force in the West.
A Chinese business consultant in a Ted-style talk justified zero-Covid policy by saying that in 10 years the West will be brought to its knees b/c long-Covid, which will decimate most of its labor force. pic.twitter.com/kQRTDYE813
“I can only say, you’d have to be stupid if you want to give up [lie flat] now. We definitely cannot give up now. What must we hold on to? The dynamic Zero Covid policy! Understand? Let the West not do anything [lie flat], because the pandemic will have serious repercussions for them. So we definitely cannot let it go. So as an ordinary consumer, an ordinary citizen, we cannot forget national humiliation. The people inside the system are much smarter and more advanced than we are. You do not get the basic picture at all. (..) Just do what you’re told. We will win. If the epidemic continues another ten years, we don’t need to fight anymore, the whole world will have fallen.”
The man speaking is Gu Junhui (顾均辉), a finance, business, and strategic positioning expert with a very small following of 336 fans on his Weibo account.
As Gu’s video was widely shared on Twitter, it also started circulating on Chinese social media, where the majority of commenters dismissed Gu Junhui as another self-proclaimed ‘expert’ riding his high horse: “Nobody is listening to this idiot.”
Others ridiculed him for such a stance, writing: “So China can finally win if the West dies out?!” Some even suggested that Gu was a comedian instead of a finance expert.
Despite the online banter, Gu’s vision of China’s dynamic zero Covid future is a recurring one in China’s online media sphere, where other bloggers and authors also measure China’s success through U.S. failures.
Blogger/author Lu Xiaozhou (@卢晓周) wrote on Weibo on November 8 that the U.S. will be drained out because it chose to “lie flat” and live together with Covid-19, a virus that is unpredictable and which scientists around the world still have not figured out.
He says that China, on the other hand, is maintaining a balance between social stability and economic development through its dynamic zero Covid policy.
According to Lu, it’s simple: dynamic zero Covid is “right” whereas coexisting with the virus is “wrong.”
“The dynamic zero Covid policy comes at a high price, and when we give up dynamic zero, we will welcome a big epidemic wave. No matter if it happens this year, next year, in five years’ time, in ten years’ time, or in fifty years’ time, that moment will eventually come.”
During a press conference Saturday, Chinese health officials stated that China would “unswervingly” stick to its zero Covid policy. A hashtag about the topic (#坚持动态清零总方针不动摇#) received 220 million views on Weibo.
In October of this year, Chinese Party newspaper People’s Daily (人民日报) already published an article titled “Dynamic Zero Is Sustainable and Must Be Adhered To” (“动态清零”可持续而且必须坚持”) (read more).
Nucleic acid testing, photo by @dotdotnews.
It is clear that many commenters have a less rose-colored view of the future of ‘zero Covid’ than some of the opinion makers.
One Zhejiang-based doctor named Gong Xiaoming with over 4,6 million followers on Weibo (@龚晓明医生) had a more sober expectation of the future:
“I was prohibited from posting for three months last year after I commented on the epidemic, but I still want to speak my mind. The dynamic zero Covid policy comes at a high price and when we give up dynamic zero Covid, it means we will welcome a big epidemic wave. That moment in time, no matter if it happens this year, next year, in five years’ time, or in ten years’ time, or in fifty years’ time, it will eventually come. So the authorities in every region must ask themselves one question: when then moment comes, are we ready?”
Dr. Gong continues:
“The 1 per 1,000 mortality figure is backed by enough medical resources, and it will probably be higher when there is an instant influx of patients and we don’t have enough medical resources. What is even more important in relation to the mortality rate is: do we have enough intensive care beds? If we still have another year, then let us please use this precious time to strengthen the establishment of the ICUs at local hospitals, to set up respiratory intensive care units, and let use this time to purchase good mechanical ventilators and equipment, strengthen the staff team, especially the medical team, which is not something that can be done within a day or not even within a month. A month ago I paid a visit to a county town with 200,000 inhabitants and the county hospital did not have one single IC bed. This made me deeply concerned. Perhaps I’m overly anxious, and the government might already be taking these steps, but if regional leaders have the vision, please strengthen your local hospital’s intensive care medical departments. Our timeframe is getting shorter. In addition to the construction of ICU, there is also medication, vaccines and other issues that need to be considered.”
Dr. Gong uses graphs with data from Taiwan to support his story, showing an uptick of cases after Taiwan let go of its own ‘zero Covid’ policy in April of 2022.
Other voices also express similar visions on the future of dynamic zero in China, seeking for science-based prospects and realistic strategies: “I really hope that the authorities can provide timely and accurate information. The main point is not whether or not we should have the dynamic zero policy, but rather how we can go forward with dynamic zero on a scientific basis,” another popular blogger (@卢麒元) wrote.
Although Dr. Gong’s post was reposted hundreds of times, the comment section was not available at the time of writing (“抱歉，该内容暂时无法查看”).
Political commentator Hu Xijin should be able to appreciate Dr. Gong’s input. In September of this year, Hu argued that more Chinese experts should come forward with suggestions and views based on science in order for the online discourse to focus more on science and rationality rather than letting “discussions be dominated by loud voices on social media.”
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The Covid-19 tracking map of China is turning red: Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, and Heilongjiang are among the provinces that have turned into ‘high-risk’ provinces where more than 100 new Covid cases have been detected around November 10-11, nearly three years after the start of China’s Covid-19 outbreak.
There currently are 3930 ‘high risk regions” in mainland China, and the epidemic situation keeps dominating discussions on Chinese social media.
“My entire Weibo timeline is just filled with complaints about the epidemic situation,” one Zhejiang-based Weibo user wrote on 11 November.
Xinjiang is the province in China that is currently seeing the highest number of new Covid cases. On November 10, the topic of Xinjiang detecting 657 new asymptomatic cases of Covid triggered online discussions on Weibo (#新疆新增无症状657例#).
Xinjiang has seen various lockdowns throughout the region since the summer of this year, but the harsh measures could not prevent the further spread of the virus. In October, residents were banned from leaving Xinjiang over more Covid-19 outbreaks, just weeks after restrictions were eased. Many areas of Ürümqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, were placed back under lockdown again.
“We’ve been in lockdown for so long, and cases are still rising?! Where is the root of the problem? Is there no control? How come there are still hundreds of new cases? I don’t know what to say anymore. The people of Xinjiang have already gone through so much,” one popular post on Weibo said.
At the same time, newly announced measures to further optimize Covid prevention and control work also went trending on Weibo on November 11, receiving over fifty million views (#进一步优化防控工作的二十条措施公布#).
The Twenty Trending Covid Measures
On November 11, China’s National Health Commission published an official notice regarding the “further optimization of the Covid-19 epidemic prevention and control measures.”
As emphasized in state media reports on the notice and the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee preceding it, China will unwaveringly stick to its dynamic zero-COVID policy and the measures are therefore not presented as a ‘relaxation’ of Covid-19 measures but rather as a way to make existing rules more efficient.
In short, these are the 20 announced measures (this is not a literal translation, just an explanation):
1. For close contacts of someone who has Covid-19, the “7-day centralized isolation + 3 days home health monitoring” measures have been adjusted to “5+3,” meaning 5 days of centralized isolation and 3 days home isolation.
2. Although close contacts will still need to go to centralized isolation, the close contacts of close contacts (‘secondary contacts’) will no longer be identified.
3. The 7-day centralized quarantine for people who return from a ‘high risk area’ will be turned into a 7-day home isolation.
4. Instead of ‘high’ – ‘medium’ – ‘low’ risk categories, zones will now be labeled as either ‘high’ or ‘low’ risk. High risk zone will be automatically downgraded to low risk zone after 5 consecutive days of no positive cases.
5. High-risk people who come from a closed loop working system will need to stay at home for 5 days and monitor their health, instead of being isolated for a week.
6. Nucleic acid testing should generally not be carried out for the entire population by administrative area, but instead the testing campaigns should be more local and precise.
7. The so-called “circuit breaking mechanism” under which China-bound flight routes were suspended for two weeks if an airline was found to carry a certain number of passengers testing positive for Covid will be abolished. Inbound travelers will need to have one certificate of a negative Covid test within 48 hours, instead of two.
8. Important business personnel or athlete groups etc. will not need to undergo an isolation period, but instead they will enter a ‘closed-loop bubble’ system for their business meetings, trainings or other activities; they will be transferred from place to place and cannot exit their bubble (the Winter Oympics in Beijing also had this system in place).
9. The Ct (cycle threshold) value of nucleic acid tests of international travellers will need to be less than 35. Those travelers showing a Ct value of 35-40 have to undergo further evaluation on virus transmission risk.
10. There will be a shortened quarantine period for international arrivals, going from a total of ten days to a total of eight days: instead of seven days of centralized quarantine and three days of health observation at home, in-bound travellers will be able to do five days of quarantine and three days of health observation at home.
11. There will be more focus on increasing resources for treatment of Covid patients, from ramping up stockpiles of Covid-19 drugs and medical equipment, to a further training of medical staff and a better preparation of inpatient and IC beds.
12. There will be more focus on further speeding up China’s vaccination and booster campaign, especially for the elderly population.
13. Research and development of Covid vaccines and drugs to treat Covid patients needs to be accelerated, especially to protect the elderly and the most vulnerable populations in China.
14. The overall protection of vulnerable groups in society, including senior citizens, pregnant women, immunocompromised patients, etc. will be further strengthened through health safety programs and effective Covid management of places where more vulnerable populations reside, including care homes and psychiatric hospitals.
15. There will be an increased focus on the effective implementation of the principle of the ‘four early’ measures to avoid large breakouts (early detection, early reporting, early isolation, early treatment).
16. Excessive Covid measures are not the way: there should be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to local outbreaks, which also means no arbitrary lockdowns of schools or entire cities.
17. Local communities are required to improve the food supplies/distribution for residents who are isolated amid local lockdowns. Communities must have certain relevant information about local residents regarding their status; who lives alone, who is pregnant, who is elderly, or otherwise more vulnerable? Residents should always have access to emergency help.
18. On-campus epidemic control must be consistent, precise, and in accordance with science. There can be no unnecessarily long lockdowns of campuses.
19. The bigger enterprises/industrial parks should be consistent, clear, and precise about their epidemic prevention and control measures from the grassroots up, making sure the system of checking who gets in & out gets properly checked, etc. is in order. Basically, these companies should do all they can to ensure the smooth flow of logistics and to make sure production can safely continue.
20. People, or groups of people, who are left stranded amid a local outbreak should get timely help and receive assistance in getting evacuated.
Online sentiments
After the announcement of the twenty measures, questions linger on Weibo. Many people ask when these measures will be implemented.
“The joy after the release of the twenty measures was subdued by the grievances on Weibo,” one Weibo user wrote, while some Ürümqi locals wrote: “So when will our lockdown be lifted? I can’t tell black from white anymore.”
Besides Xinjiang, people in other regions are also concerned about the epidemic situation. There are a lot of complaints from Chongqing, for example (#重庆新增本土感染者783例#), but also from Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, and other cities and areas in high-risk provinces.
“These cities all did a good job in their anti-epidemic control but it’s now all gone to ruins, this shows that the virus can’t be controlled, and there is no way to eliminate it. We need to be ready for it and to live with it,” one Weibo commenter wrote.
“Of all the twenty measures announced, I think number 11 is most important,” one Weibo user wrote: “We need to increase medical resources.”
Another commenter said: “The Dynamic Zero Covid policy isn’t changing. Just because you’re updating the software doesn’t mean you have a new computer.”
One Shanghai blogger wrote: “I found that the so-called ‘anti-epidemic fans’ are two types of people. They are either those who are carefree, either children or those whose work has not been affected by the pandemic; and then those who have not experienced a lockdown themselves, they do not understand the difficulties of a lockdown and how they prevent you from making a living. For them, Covid is far removed from their reality, so they just do not get it.”
Despite all criticism from those who think nothing is going to change, some also express worries about the things that might now change. As one Weibo user wrote on November 12:
“To be honest, I wasn’t anxious at all at the beginning of the epidemic, because I knew the government would control everything. But yesterday and today I began to be very worried because we are actually already easing [measures]. Once we let go, the epidemic will really break out. There will be mass infections and deaths. I’m not necessarily afraid of getting infected, I can take some Chinese medicine and I’m sure I’ll be ok, but we don’t know the long-term effects.”
Overall, there is a sense of anxiousness in the online responses to China’s current Covid outbreaks and the new Covid measures. There are those who are anxious about when their current lockdowns will finally come to an end, and then there are those who are worried about what a possible ‘easing’ of measures might actually mean.
The majority of people at least agree on one thing: there is no easy way ‘out.’ This might just become a long, long winter.
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Beijing is fighting against the largest Covid-19 outbreak the city has ever seen. Although the capital city has managed to avoid major strict lockdowns since the start of the pandemic, it is now struggling to contain this wave of local cases.
This weekend, Beijing reported 621 new Covid cases within 24 hours. The city’s Chaoyang District has seen the most cases, and on November 20 from 0:00 to 15:00, Chaoyang reported 357 new cases.
As of 7:00 am on November 20, Beijing’s Ditan Hospital, which is located in Chaoyang, had admitted 608 patients with Covid, including 431 ‘light’ cases and 171 asymptomatic ones. A day earlier, the hospital reported the death of one Covid patient with underlying medical conditions – Beijing’s first Covid-19 death in months.
Local authorities asked residents not to meet up, to stay home as much as possible, and not to leave the district (“非必要不跨区”), starting a ‘semi lockdown.’
Beijing’s Haidian District published a similar statement on November 19, saying that the current Covid situation in Haidian was at a “critical stage.” The city’s Fengtai District also advised people to only go out if necessary.
Many residents complain about another round of ‘working from home’ and ‘home quarantine’: “I went out an visited a hospital recently, and because there was a Covid positive patient there, I had to stay at home. Then my community discovered a positive case and I had to stay at home some more. Now the company informed us that we’re supposed to stay home. My stay at home is getting longer and longer!”
Others are also expressing despair: “Once the lockdown of the dorms is over, then the company gets locked down, once the company’s lockdown ends, my hometown is locked down. When can I ever get home?”
One Beijing resident writes: “You are not giving the ordinary people a way out. At the word of command, all restaurants are closed, getting take-out has become impossible. May I ask, who can I turn to to get reimbursed for my rent and employee wages? Who can give me a way to survive?”
“This all is like magic realism. I really do not understand,” one female Weibo user from Beijing writes: “I received an epidemiological surveillance call, telling me to stay home for seven days (..) I asked my community and they said no need, three days and three checks is fine. Then another district is letting Chaoyang workers stay home, yet now companies in Chapyang are letting workers from Chaoyang come to work, and let staff from other district stay home, hahaha, I’m so confused it just makes me laugh.”
“So we’re not opening up at all?”, another person asked, while another person wrote: “Beijing needs to be more decisive in its prevention and control measures if it wants to suppress the epidemic, otherwise there is a danger of repeating the same mistakes as Guangzhou.”
Earlier this week, changing Covid policies in Shijiazhuang seemed to be a signal of the start of a nationwide relaxion of Covid rules, just days after new Covid rules were announced by Chinese health authorities.
Because many testing locations closed around Beijing on Monday (Nov 14), some had seen it as a sign that the city was changing its Covid policies.
Political commentator Hu Xijin, who happens to reside in Beijing’s Chaoyang, wrote on November 20: “The kind of ‘opening up’ that some people want is not possible, at least not in China this winter or next spring. Whether they like it or not, this is my judgment. So it is useless to discuss this idea now, as it will only cause confusion and increase the impatient mood in society.”
As he previously did, Hu maintains that complete ‘liberalization’ nor complete lockdowns are the answer to China’s current Covid predicament, so he advocates maintaining a large level of control without a tremendous impact on economy and social life.
Despite the many people supporting his stance, there are also dozens of commenters who criticize it. “It’s all fine as long as you’re getting your pay,” some said: “We’re losing hope.”
To read more on the latest regarding Covid-related trends on Chinese social media, check our recent articles here.
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This residential community in the Chinese city of Zhengzhou, Henan Province, is raising discussions on Chinese social media for a stern warning that is blasted over the entrance gate loudspeakers: “Outsiders will be executed on the spot with the authority of law” (“外来人员就地正法格杀勿论”).
The community is the Tianxiacheng Community (天下城社区) in the Jinshui District of Zhengzhou. Zhengzhou is currently the city with the worst Covid outbreak in the province, and Jinshui is among the affected districts.
A video showing the community gate in question went viral on Chinese social media, and the stern tone of the message and the serious face of the guard did not exactly make the situation look like it was meant to be a joke.
According to Chinese media outlets, a community staff member later suggested that this was a non-official, self-initiated move by the property management and that it has since been corrected.
According to various Chinese news sources, the harsh warning telling outsides not to enter the community relates to people from outside the residential community coming inside the community gates to do their nucleic acid tests at the Tianxiacheng testing point. Trying to minimize people’s movements in light of the ongoing Covid outbreak, property management staff clearly were not happy about these cross-community flows of people and took rather drastic measures to stop them.
“Perhaps it was a joke,” one person commented: “But it’s a joke without any humour.”
This residential community in Zhengzhou is trending b/o the message on repeat via loudspeakers at gate: "Outsiders coming in will be killed on the spot." Too many people from outside apparently visited the community for its Covid test point (& person in charge is a bit dramatic). pic.twitter.com/va5gziKBaj
“What is most scary in China? It’s the newly gained power of people at the lowest rung of society,” one Weibo blogger from Hebei wrote: “It’s scarier to people than ghosts and gods.”
“Actually, there are many epidemic prevention enthusiasts who are infatuated with the idea of having this kind of power – they don’t want it to end!”
In light of China’s recent Covid wave, there have been multiple incidents showing how local anti-epidemic authorities take excessive measures in the fight to curb the spread of the virus. In Guangzhou, two women were tied up by local anti-epidemic workers after they violated local epidemic rules; in Daqing, a milk tea shop was temporarily closed down after a shop assistant welcomed customers before asking them to swipe their health app; in Mudanjiang, one business was given a ‘yellow card’ when an employee was caught taking a nap in an empty store without wearing a mask.
Although many people commenting on the Zhengzhou Tianxiacheng Community incident blamed it on local staff abusing their authority, there are also those who blame it on the lack of nucleic acid testing points.
“Frankly speaking, when public places require a negative Covid-test taken within 24 hours, yet there are not enough nucleic acid test points around, you’ll see this kind of problems,” one popular Weibo blogger from Guangdong (@好大的奕) wrote.
Despite all criticism, there are also those who stress the funny side of the situation. “Before I clicked this: this surely must be in Northern China (Beifang). After I clicked it: of course, it’s you, Henan!”
“What’s the problem?” another person wondered: “Have you all completely lost your sense of humor now?”
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A fire that occured in Urumqi city, Xinjiang, on the evening of November 24 has triggered waves of mourning and anger on Chinese social media. Ten people lost their lives in the fire, and nine people sustained injuries.
According to Chinese media reports, the fire broke out at 19:54 at the 15th floor of a high-rise residential building in the Jixiangyuan community (吉祥苑小区) in the city’s Tianshan district. The fire further spread up to the 17th floor, with the smoke going up to the 21st floor. It was not until 22:35 on Thursday night before the fire was extinguished.
There have been various reports circulating online suggesting that there was a delay in fire trucks arriving at the scene of the emergency. Obstructions on the road allegedly prevented firefighters from moving forward and the road obstructions (possibly also including pillars and parked cars) had to be removed first. Local authorities are currently investigating the incident.
A preliminary investigation into the cause of the fire indicates that it was of electrical origin, and was caused by a multi-plug power board located in an apartment bedroom. A hashtag related to this received over 220 million views on Weibo on Friday (#乌鲁木齐住宅楼火灾疑因插线板着火引发#).
Image via Phoenix News.
On Weibo, there are many questions and rumors surrounding the incident. Was there indeed a delay in the rescue operation? What prevented the fire trucks from coming to the scene, and why? Was the building in lockdown or not? Did the building management adhere to all fire safety guidelines, or could a potential lockdown have prevented a quick evacuation?
And why were several images of the incident censored on Weibo, where one hashtag about the case received 1.5 billion views (#新疆一高层住宅楼火灾致10人死亡#) (yet did not show up in the top 20 of most popular topics)?
“Over 1.5 billion views, nowhere to be seen in the hot lists..” one commenter remarked.
The fire led to more public attention to the Covid lockdown situation in Urumqi. Urumqi has been in (semi-)lockdown for most of the time since August 10 of this year. The Tianshan District of the city is among one of the areas that have been especially affected by local outbreaks. Last month, locals turned to social media for help and to vent about Covid symptoms, high food prices, boredom and depression, the living conditions in their fangcang (makeshift hospital for Covid-positive isolation), and difficult access to medical care.
As Chinese netizens mourned the victims of the fire, they also expressed anger over how these people spent the last 106 days of their lives in (partial) lockdown. Some posted protest images saying “NO” to excessive epidemic measures.
At the time of the fire, the Jixiangyuan community was officially designated a ‘low risk’ area according to Chinese official media reports, meaning residents should have been able to move around their residential building.
But many netizens pointed out that the community was still labeled as a ‘high-risk’ area according to local epidemic data. At the time of writing, the community is no longer listed among the 66 ‘high-risk’ communities/areas in Tianshan District.
Screenshot shared on social media, showing that the community in question was a designated high risk area.
A screenshot that circulated online shows a WeChat notification of local community staff on November 21, telling residents that positive cases had been detected in the latest nucleic acid samples and that they were required to stay home for three days and that the unit doors would be sealed. This screenshot has not been officially verified or confirmed.
The famous actress and dancer Tong Liya (佟丽娅), who is of Xibe ethnicity and was born in Xinjiang, also posted about the incident. She published an image mourning the victims of the fire, saying she hopes they can rest in peace (#佟丽娅发文悼念乌鲁木齐火灾逝者#).
Besides all the mourning and confusion, there is anger, especially because it has not yet been clarified if the residents who passed away were blocked from leaving their units.
Digital artwork made in response to 11.24 Urumqi fire, original creator unknown.
While waiting for official investigation reports to come out, some are calling out for letting other provinces or regions do the investigation because they are scared the truth might not come out if local officials are in charge of the investigation themselves.
“Last time it was the Guizhou bus, now it is the Urumqi apartment building fire,” multiple commenters wrote. “History keeps repeating itself and it’s the common poor people who pay the price.”
In September of this year, a bus transporting Guizhou residents to a Covid-19 quarantine facility crashed, killing 27 of those on board.
One popular post received over 200,000 likes on Friday, with the blogger writing:
“The Guizhou transfer bus incident killed 27; a Chongqing pregnant woman miscarried; a child in Lanzhou died prematurely [link]; those going downstairs during Chengdu earthquake found emergency exits sealed; in Xi’an a pregnant women about to give birth bleeds outside the hospital waiting for nucleic acid results [link]; an Inner Mongolian girl did not get to spend the last moments with her mother who jumped off a building [link]. And here we go again today, with residents burning to death in Xinjiang (…).”
On Friday, the Public Security Bureau issued a statement saying a 24-year-old woman had been detained for spreading rumors on Weibo about the Urumqi fire. The woman will be detained for ten days (#女子造谣乌鲁木齐火灾死亡人数被拘#). The woman allegedly spread rumors about the death toll of the incident.
We will post an update to this story once the official report regarding the Urumqi fire comes out.
UPDATE:
On Friday night, around midnight, local officials held a press conference regarding the fire (#乌鲁木齐1124火灾事故发布会#). During the press conference, officials refuted any rumors of the doors in the building being locked. They also confirmed that the building had been designated as ‘low risk’ and that residents were able to go downstairs since November 20.
One comment by an official in the press conference regarding how some residents lacked the knowledge or capability to timely rescue themselves (“部分居民自防自救能力弱”) triggered anger on social media. One commenter sarcastically wrote: “We’re sorry, lacking the knowledge to rescue ourselves, sorry to inconvenience you.”
Private cars parked on road sides, narrow streets, and safety pillars allegedly made it more difficult for fire trucks to reach the scene of the fire.
Within thirty minutes after the press conference starting, a designated hashtag on Weibo had received over 160 million views.
The contents of the stream of comments on Chinese social media directly following the press conference indicated that online anger had not been subdued at all.
“I thought they would come to apologize, instead they came to hold [residents] accountable,” some wrote: “It’s all the people’s fault.”
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A deadly fire in Urumqi triggered anger and unrest in the Xinjiang capital. After people vented their frustrations on social media and even took their anger to the streets, the local government announced on Saturday morning that the city has basically cleared Covid-19 cases at the community level.
The past two days have been filled with anger and unrest in the Xinjiang capital city Urumqi and beyond.
The direct trigger for the unrest, which led to large crowds gathering and chanting in the city streets, is the fire that broke out in a residential building on Thursday night.
Video reportedly showing citizens in #Xinjiang’s Urumqi protesting in front of a government building. Some could be heard chanting “let’s die together.” The authenticity of the video can’t be independently verified atm, but there have been several other videos … https://t.co/Dgw2P5AA1h
On Chinese social media, the fire, which left ten people dead, caused anger among people who connected the deadly inferno to the ongoing stringent Covid measures in Urumqi, where some residents have been in (partial) lockdown for over a hundred days.
At a press conference that was held late on Friday night, local officials refuted ongoing rumors that residents had not been allowed to leave the building and also stated that any claims of doors being sealed were untrue.
The press conference, which immediately went viral on Weibo, did not subdue the online anger and instead only seemed to trigger more waves of anger, especially because one official mentioned the residents’ inability to “rescue themselves” instead of taking accountability for the devastating fire. (Urumqi Mayor Mamtimin Hadir did issue an apology to ‘all the people of Urumqi’ for the incident #乌鲁木齐市长就10死火灾事故致歉#).
A hashtag related to the Friday night press conference (#乌鲁木齐1124火灾事故发布会#) received over 1,8 billion views on Weibo.
Around the same time, on Friday night, videos and images started circulating on social media relating to protests breaking out in Urumqi. Although the topic was censored and not officially reported by Chinese media, it still turned out to be a sleepless night for many Chinese social media users who were glued to their screens, searching for the latest information.
“Knowing that people in Urumqi are out in the street marching and chanting, I cannot peacefully sleep tonight,” some wrote, with others writing that people in the streets had carried a national flag and sung the national anthem. “I hope all these warriors are safe,” some said.
Do You Hear the People Sing, one of the most recognizable songs of the Les Misérables musical, also circulated on Chinese social media as a protest song in light of all the built-up frustrations over Covid policies and the Urumqi fire. Various people posted the text: “Do you hear the people sing? Singing the song of angry men?”
Do You Hear the People Sing, one of the most recognizable songs of Les Miserables musical is once again surfacing on Chinese social media as a protest song in light of built up frustrations over Covid policies and the recent Urumqi fire. pic.twitter.com/FEslt9dWqK
On Saturday morning, November 26, the local government suddenly announced that the city has “basically cleared Covid-19 cases at the community level,” and that the city will “restore order to the lives of residents in low-risk areas in a phased manner.” Residents in low-risk areas can leave their homes while maintaining social distancing, wearing masks, and not gathering together.
On November 25, Urumqi reported a total of 116 new cases in the past 24 hours. At the time of writing, Urumqi still has 934 areas that are designated as “high-risk.”
The hashtag “Urumqi Basically Reaches Zero Covid at Community Level” (#乌鲁木齐社会面基本清零#) received 1,7 billion (!) views within hours. Another related hashtag, “Urumqi In Phases Restores Orderly Life for Residents in Low-Risk Areas” (#乌鲁木齐分阶段恢复低风险区居民生活秩序#) received over 420 million clicks.
The comments just kept flooding Weibo, where many expressed surprise and exasperation about the Covid situation seemingly changing overnight.
“Thanks to the people who took to the streets yesterday,” one commenter wrote.
“They say it’s cleared, so it is cleared. The party secretary’s word will do! The building was on fire, and now the internet is on fire,” one Weibo blogger wrote on Saturday morning.
“Hasn’t it been raining all the time? Then why do you suddenly say it’s sunny?”
Meanwhile, photos and comments from Urumqi-based netizens confirmed that some areas had indeed lifted local lockdowns and that people were roaming the streets.
Some people expressed worry that by slowly lifting the lockdowns, the anger would fade and the momentum for protest and social change would vanish: “Every time a big transformation is taking place, there will always be people settling for just a little profit.”
“We want freedom, we want democracy,” one Shanghai-based commenter wrote.
“Last night’s protests cleared the Covid,” one person concluded: “It’s like magic.”
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The Communication University of China in Nanjing (南京传媒学院, abbr. CUCN) is trending on Weibo on Saturday night, with one hashtag receiving over 180 million views on Weibo before 23:00 local time.
Students at the university gathered on Saturday evening, chanting slogans such as “long live the people” and turning on the lights on their phone as a tribute to victims of the fire in Urumqi.
Over the past few days, there has been ongoing unrest in various parts of China. The fire that occurred in Urumqi on November 24 triggered waves of anger online (read here), and at the same time there have also been other incidents that further intensified the anger, which some also took to the street.
Another incident that attracted a lot of online attention this week happened in the Shunde District of Foshan, Guangdong, on November 24. Online, the incident was referred to as a “stampede,” but the hashtag “Foshan Stampede” (#佛山踩踏#) was soon taken offline. According to China Daily, the incident happened when a crowd of people gathered at a Covid testing place in the Xincheng community of Leliu subdistrict at about 8:30 am. The situation became chaotic when people fell down due to the slippery ground, but nobody reportedly was injured.
Nevertheless, the incident surely did not help to calm the growing tensions, especially this week when we also saw protests and unrest at Foxconn in Zhengzhou and the third consecutive daily record for new Covid cases in mainland China following by local (semi-) lockdowns across the country.
Meanwhile, on Saturday night, Weibo flooded with comments in support of the students who stood up to make their voices be heard.
“I’m not there with you, but I’m there with you,” one commenter wrote, with others posting: “Brave young people. This society is no longer giving them a way to live. History is repeating itself. If we don’t do this now, it’s our children who will have to struggle.”
“CUCN come on!” some cheered, while others wrote: “We’re proud of you.”
Some screenshots claiming to come from people at the scene said that it was the students’ intention to show solidarity with the people who passed away in the Urumqi fire and those in Xinjiang who were treated unfairly in light of the ongoing lockdowns the region saw since August of this year.
An anonymous poster warned people not to believe rumors regarding the protest being a conflict between the school leadership and the students: “The school is protecting its students, although some on the internet would like you to believe otherwise.”
Lights at the CUCN scene were allegedly turned off to prevent students from being identifiable on videos and photos.
As soon as the live commenting section on the CUCN protests was shut down by Weibo, another topic came up before midnight.
Students at the Xi’an Academy of Fine Arts (西安美术学院) were also taking their anger to the campus streets, where they allegedly demanded for freedom amid Covid lockdowns.
One commenter wrote: “Tonight is the night when students are flooding the internet, their fire [torch] will burn forever, what a magnificent night!”
“The students are very brave, they are the first to stand up. I hope the workers will stand up, and finally, all people will stand up.”
Many people on Chinese social media posted references to La Jeunesse (New Youth), a Chinese literary magazine that was founded in 1915 by Chen Duxiu and also influenced China’s May Fourth Movement (sometimes referred to as the Chinese Enlightenment), which was all about the Chinese youth being the catalyst for transformation.
“You are the heroes of the awakening,’ others wrote.
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After days of unrest, Party newspaper Zhejiang Daily published an article by the Propaganda Department (aka Publicity Department) that addresses the current problems in China’s epidemic situation, talks about the way forward, and stresses the importance of listening to people’s demands and “putting the people first.” But not everyone is convinced.
On Tuesday, November 29, after days filled with unrest and protests in various places across China, Party newspaper Zhejiang Daily (浙江日报) published a noteworthy article titled “‘People First’ Is Not ‘Anti-Epidemic [Measures] First'” (“人民至上”不是“防疫至上“).
The phrase “the people first” (人民至上 rénmín zhìshàng), also “putting the people in the first place,” is an important part of the Party’s ‘people-based, people-oriented’ governing concept. The phrase became especially relevant as part of Xi Jinping’s now-famous “put people and their life first” slogan (人民至上，生命至上, rénmín zhìshàng, shēngmìng zhìshàng), which became one of the most important official phrases of 2020 in light of the fight against Covid19.
The Zhejiang article starts by addressing the recent unrest surrounding China’s zero Covid policy, writing:
Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus epidemic in late 2019, already three years have passed. As the time of preventing and controlling the epidemic situation is getting stretched, many people’s psychological tolerance and endurance level are put to the test, and they are even breaking down little by little. As some netizens say: if the first year was about panic followed by the secret joy of being able to have a good rest at home; the second year began to be more bewildering and was about the hope for a quick end to the epidemic situation; the third year is then more about dissatisfaction, when will this finally end?”
The article mentioned that in addition to growing frustrations about the endless pandemic, various places across China have been intensifying their anti-epidemic efforts in the wrong ways:
“”(..) they are abusing their power, and are making things difficult for the people. This has led to epidemic prevention becoming deformed. They will not explicitly say they are locking down, but they are locking down, they are ignoring the interests of the masses and the demands of the people, interrupting the order of normal life at their will, and are even disregarding the lives and safety of the people, harming the image of the Party and the government, and breaking the hearts of the masses. There are even some people who will seize this epidemic situation to make money. Compared to the epidemic, it’s these phenomena which are hurting people. The ensuing sense of helplessness and tiredness and anger are all understandable.”
The article then stresses:
“Anti-epidemic measures are to guard against the virus, not to guard against the people; it was always [supposed to be] about ‘people first,’ not about so-called ‘epidemic prevention’ first. Regardless what kind of prevention and control measures are taken, they should all be aimed at letting society return to normal as soon as possible and getting life back on track as soon as possible. They are all are like “bridges” and “boats” to reach this goal, and are not meant to keep people in place, as blind and rash actions that disregard the costs.”
Zhejiang Daily mentions how the World Cup in Qatar has made some people wonder about the crowds in the audience not wearing any masks, as if there was no pandemic at all. If they can, why can’t China?
As the foremost reason, the article mentions the relatively low number of hospital beds in China.
Whereas countries such as South Korea or Japan, which are still seeing high numbers of new Covid infections, have about 12.6 beds per 1000 people (12.65 and 12.63 respectively), China only has 6.7.
With the United States being mentioned as an example of a country where Covid-19 patients were using up 32.7% of total nationwide ICU capacity early in 2022, with 7 ICU beds per 100,000 people being occupied by Covid patients, the article suggests that China does not even have this many ICU beds per 100,000 people.
Zhejiang Daily posted its article on Weibo, where one related hashtag received over 350 million views by Tuesday night.
The article further mentions how China, which is a rapidly ageing country, has a relatively large elderly population. With mortality rates being higher in Covid patients over the age of 60, it is estimated that if China would let go of its Covid measures, some 600,000 seniors (60+) catching the virus would die (the article bases this estimation on mortality rates in the Singaporean Covid epidemic.)
Due to Chinese historical, social and traditional values, the protection of the country’s eldest is of great importance. Zhejiang Daily suggests that this is different from Western societies: “Some Western countries had nursing homes where hundreds of people passed away during the epidemic – if that would happen in China, it would be unacceptable. If you understand this point, you can also understand all the efforts we are putting out to contain the epidemic situation.”
And so, Zhejiang Daily highlights the high price people in many Western countries paid to get to the stage in the epidemic where they are today.
The article repeats some of the arguments that have previously also been included in writings in other newspapers and by political commentator Hu Xijin, namely that with China’s current zero-Covid policy and the adjustments that were recently made, the country is now focusing on precise and science-backed epidemic prevention that is meant to put as little strain as possible on society and economy.
However, the latest changes and the essence of China’s zero Covid policy are not properly implemented everywhere, the article says, as there is a lack of understanding or an incapability to handle the situation due to a local lack of staff or available methods. Then there is also the issue of some people making money off of to strict epidemic measures. This has all led to tragic situations that should never have happened.
Although the article does not mention any concrete examples, there are many recent incidents where people did not get the help they needed because of excessive Covid measures. We have covered some of the biggest ones on What’s on Weibo, including the young girl who passed away after getting gravely ill at a quarantine location in Ruzhou; the toddler who died due to carbon monoxide poisoning and a severe delay in medical help in Lanzhou; and the woman who jumped from the 12th floor of an apartment building in Hohhot, although her daughters had been seeking requesting help for her deteriorating mental state for hours.
The problem at hand, Zhejiang Daily suggests, is that some local authorities are putting epidemic prevention first instead of putting people’s lives first. The problem can also not be solved by letting go of all measures, nor by adhering to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ zero Covid policy (“走出疫情阴霾，不是一句“放”与“不放”就能解决的事情.”)
Instead of fighting for ‘opening up’ versus ‘closing down’, the point is to find a “soft landing” (“软着陆”) way out the “haze of the epidemic situation” (“走出疫情阴霾”).
Although the article does not give very concrete answers on what the best way forward is – although it does mention increasing China’s vaccination rates, hospital beds, and available medications, – it proposes to look at the exact pain points within the bigger picture, and to deal with them one by one in order to quickly improve epidemic situations across the country.
At the same time, it also advocates that the various systems that are in place across China should be efficiently unified. The health code system in China is not operated nationally, and instead, various regions are each working with their own Health Code apps (see this article).
So, in other words: local problems should be spotlighted and dealt with, while regional innovative tools or effective measures should also be pinpointed and standardized across the country (“一地创新、全国使用”).
The article does not explicitly mention the recent unrest across China, but it does hint at it: “The voices and the demands of the people have always been the central point regarding the adjustment and optimization of anti-epidemic policies. There is only one goal in the fight against the virus, and that is to benefit the people, to protect the health and safety of every person. If we hold on to this point, our steps won’t be chaotic, and our actions won’t stray from the intended line.”
On Weibo and WeChat, the article is discussed by many netizens (#浙江宣传发文人民至上不是防疫至上#). One hashtag related to the article received over 350 million views on Weibo on Tuesday (#人民至上不是防疫至上#).
Many people spoke out in support of the article.
“This is a well-written article. It really combines the two components of ‘what we want to say’ and ‘what the ordinary people want to hear,’ it brings in some fresh air, clears up some confusion and eases the mood,” one commenter from Hubei writes: “But why is only Zhejiang Daily publishing this? The Zhejiang Propaganda [department] is the pride on the propaganda front, the fact that there’s just one Zhejiang Propaganda [department] is the sorrow on the propaganda front.”
“Finally something that’s clear-headed,” others wrote. “This article actually moved me. There’s been masses of people raising their voice recently because some local epidemic measures are creating problems and are not benefiting the people. No matter how we solve it, the target is unchanged.”
“Well put!” others wrote: “So what do we do now?”
But not everyone was convinced that the article is meaningful. “I don’t buy it,” one person wrote: “This won’t do much more than a fart.”
“The title is welcomed by the people, the content protects the central authority,” another commenter said.
The Zhejiang Daily article suggests that there is nothing wrong with the general zero-Covid policy and the twenty new measures, but instead points at how various places across the country have different interpretations of the policies and sometimes take drastic measures which actually undermine the authority of the central government (“中央定下来的“动态清零”总方针、优化防控二十条措施，一些地方有不同解读，极大降低了中央政策的权威性.”)
“It only scratches the outside of the boot,” another Weibo user replied: “It does not talk about the main point and avoids taking responsibility by how it’s written. It shifts the conflict to ordinary people (..), the fact that we are still reading these kinds of [xxx] articles in 2022 is typical [xxx] socialism.”
Regardless of criticism, many people did praise how Zhejiang authorities wrote the article: “Zhejiang has done quite well, and I’ll praise their Publicity Department.”
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Chinese media reports about the official response to the arrest of a UK reporter during protests in Shanghai has gone viral on Chinese social media, without explicitly mentioning the circumstances in which the incident occurred. Chinese netizens are now demanding videos to ‘expose’ how the situation unfolded.
News about the arrest of BBC journalist Edward Lawrence while covering the second night of protests in Shanghai on November 27 has not only made headlines in English-language media, it also became a trending topic on Chinese social media.
On Tuesday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian (赵立坚) responded to the incident in a regular press conference. A day earlier, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak denounced the arrest of the BBC journalist as “shocking and unacceptable.”
But according to Zhao, the incident has been distorted by Western media to paint China in a bad light. The Chinese side claims that Lawrence refused to cooperate with the police and failed to show his credentials. “There are many foreign media in China, why is it always the BBC that has problems at the scene? This is a question that must be seriously considered.”
Zhao’s comments went viral on Weibo in two hashtags, namely “Zhao Lijian Presents the Truth about the BBC Reporter Who Was Taken Away” (#赵立坚介绍BBC记者被带离真相#), and “Why Is It Always BBC That Has Problems at the Scene?”(#为什么每次都是BBC在现场出问题#).
Zhao Lijian on Tuesday.
A translation of the full statement by Zhao was also posted on the official website of the Chinese Embassy in the UK. Part of the statement said:
“On the night of November 27, to maintain public order, local police in Shanghai asked people who had gathered at a crossroads to leave. One of those at the scene is a resident journalist from the BBC. Though the police made it clear to the journalist and others that they needed to leave, the journalist refused to go and in the entire time did not identify himself as a journalist. The police then took him away from the scene. After verifying his identity and informing him of pertinent laws and regulations, the police let him leave. Everything was conducted within legal procedures. This BBC journalist refused to cooperate with the police’s law enforcement efforts and then acted as if he were a victim. The BBC immediately twisted the story and massively propagated the narrative that its journalist had been “arrested” and “beaten” by police while he was working, simply to try to paint China as the guilty party. This deliberate distortion of truth is all too familiar as part of the BBC’s distasteful playbook.”
On Weibo, the statement by Zhao, including video, was published by state media outlet Global Times (环球时报), which did not explicitly report that the incident happened during demonstrations in Shanghai. Instead, they reported about ‘the scene’ and that it allegedly happened “in the course of his work” “记者在工作中”).
One top comment on Weibo said: “The BBC is always making up rumors, there are engaged in an anti-Chinese campaign. They should be punished.” That comment received over 6700 likes.
“Are BBC reporters really reporting on the news, or are they making the news up?” another popular reply said.
The idea that Western mainstream media outlets are ‘creative’ in their reports about China has been a long-standing one on Chinese social media. In a well-known example from 2017, social media users accused American broadcaster CNN of staging an anti-ISIS protest in London after a Twitter user uploaded a video that showed how police and TV producers directed a group of Muslim women to stand in line with their protest signs behind the TV anchor. The BBC was also widely criticized for using the allegedly “staged” CNN footage.
Although many netizens gave their thumbs up for Zhao’s remarks, there were also some who wanted to know more about the incident.
One popular comment said: “Was there just one BBC reporter at the scene? Why would take away a hard-working journalist? What was the BBC reporter recording? Were there also Chinese reporters? If so, can you give us the real recordings of what was happening at the scene?”
“Domestic reporters wouldn’t dare to post it,” someone replied: “The scene was too electrifying.”
“Give us the irrefutable evidence to expose these ‘outside forces,'” some said.
The idea that “outside forces” or “external forces” (外部势力) had something to do with the protests first started increasingly popping up in social media discussions on late Sunday night, and it was also raised in an online column by the political commentator Hu Xijin (read here).
Zhao Lijian also reiterated this idea in Monday’s press conference in by talking about “forces with ulterior motives” (別有用心的勢力) who had connected the Urumqi fire, which initially triggered the unrest, with the local response to Covid-19.
“Thousands of people are protesting, they must all be foreigners. CNN and BBC are fully responsible. Except for us and North Korea, the whole world is watching these news channels. The entire world – except for us – is wrong,” one commenter wrote.
Many commenters kept asking for video proof of the incident: “I demand you make the video public so we can all denounce them, we will resolutely denounce them” one person wrote, adding a melon-eating emoji (吃瓜 ‘eating melon’ is frequently used as a humorous reference to standing by and watching the scene unfold).
“We firmly denounce disturbing editing, give us the original video!”
Despite the banter, there were also some more serious comments. One Weibo user wrote: “Foreign reporters often do not have good intentions, they are often distorting the facts, and I hate that. But domestic reporters do not dare to face the epidemic situation and only report on the good news.”
“So who can actually give us the truth?” others wondered.
Read more about the “11.24” unrest or “white blank paper protests” in China here.
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Hu Xijin (胡锡进), the Beijing-based retired editor-in-chief of the state-run Global Times, recently published a post on the Chinese social media platform Weibo about him getting mentally ready to be infected with Covid-19 soon.
The former journalist Hu, whose posts and statements often go trending and influence public opinion, also made a few other noteworthy comments.
On Sunday (Dec 4), Hu posted: “Over the past week, China has essentially ended widespread lockdowns, with places like Beijing and others beginning to allow home quarantine for many positive individuals, while reducing the scope of nucleic acid testing. These are amazing changes.”
Four weeks ago, right before China introduced its twenty new Covid measures, Hu already argued that strict lockdowns are no longer sustainable and that China should aim for a more relaxed and local approach (which is exactly what happened).
Now, Hu Xijin says that he is “mentally preparing to be infected with Covid within the coming month” (“做好了在一个月之内被感染上的思想准备”), further writing:
“In order for young people to have a colorful young era, in order to save the livelihood of so many service industry workers, in order for people from all walks of life to avoid seeing their wages cut, in order for so many companies to get out of their predicaments, this 62-year-old ‘Old Hu’ is willing to participate in the risk of getting [a virus that] degenerated to only 2.5 per 10,000 rate of getting seriously ill.”
Hu’s post was published on December 2nd in the context of Hu Says, a regular video column by Hu Xijin.
A few months ago, such a comment coming from such a big account would have been unthinkable.
But Hu’s comments come at a time when there are more discussions about getting Covid and sharing the experiences of having Covid.
In the second week of November, shortly after Chinese authorities launched their updated Covid rules, the hashtag “What Is It Like to Catch Covid-19?” (#感染新冠是什么体验#) already went trending on Weibo, along with other hashtags informing Chinese netizens about what it’s like to get Covid – a virus that so many in China never experienced first hand.
Since Hu Xijin (1960) ended his career as the editor-in-chief of Global Times in 2021, his role as a political commentator has arguably become even more important and more visible on Weibo than before, especially in China’s challenging Covid times of 2021.
Some find him overly nationalistic, for others he is not nationalistic enough; there are those who find him reasonable, and then some say he is repetitive and just dancing to the tune of Party propaganda. But then there have also been some discussions – in light of Pelosi’s controversial Taiwan visit – about Hu misleading public opinion by not matching the official stance.
Whichever it is, some things are certain: Hu has some 25 million followers on Weibo, and he is often the first major media account that is allowed to discuss in detail some major sensitive social topics, even if these online discussions are otherwise being tightly controlled (think of the Tangshan BBQ Restaurant incident, the future of zero Covid, the Urumqi fire, and the 11.24 protests across China.)
Hu’s comments about ‘catching Covid soon’ can be seen as part of a wider trend of normalizing Covid in the Chinese online media sphere, preparing people to face a virus they are still unfamiliar with since ‘zero Covid’ has always been the main goal.
On December 3, Hu further clarified his comments about preparing to getting Covid. He explained he expects to catch the virus because he is active in the media environment, through which he unavoidably is in touch with many different people. He also promised that if he might get infected, he would share his Covid experience with all of his readers.
As the idea of catching Covid is becoming more normalized (there are more and more trending hashtags informing what to expect after getting Covid, e.g. #新冠发病7天内身体会发生什么变化#), people are also exchanging non-scientifical advice on how to prevent catching Covid, such as drinking licorice ginger soup, holding Sichuan peppercorns inside your mouth when going out, or getting silicon covers for the drains in the bathroom to prevent the virus coming through via neighboring apartments.
Some express their worries about catching the virus. “I’m really scared. I’ve already replaced all of my masks with K95 ones,” one Weibo user wrote: “My immune system has been weak since I was little, and I have allergies. I have the feeling that if I get infected I might lose half my life, if I don’t die (..) I’m in a state of panic.”
Even though China is still far from ‘opening up’, some people are already preparing to ‘live together with the virus,’ reminding others that getting vaccinated, keeping social distance, and washing hands are all measures that will help in preventing getting Covid.
“I am worried about getting Covid but I also want to open up,” some on Weibo said.
“As much as I wanted it all to end, this feels abrupt,” one social media user from Inner Mongolia wrote: “It won’t be the same as before. The thorough ‘zero Covid’ [policy] has gone. The country’s protection of our health has gone up to this point. I hope everyone can now take care in prevention themselves, and protect themselves and their families. I hope the epidemic situation will end soon, that the world will be ok, and that we can have our freedom.”
Meanwhile, Hu Xijin informed netizens on Saturday that he had some milk, boiled eggs, pastry and pickled mustard greens for breakfast. While working on his condition and nutrition, he says that if his Covid positive time comes, he will not get any VIP treatment. If allowed, he’ll either recover from home or go to a centralized Covid location.
He will just have to wait and see what happens, just as millions of other Chinese citizens are waiting to see what this winter is going to bring.
By Manya Koetse, with contributions by Miranda Barnes
The featured images are all images that went viral recently in light of China opening up (including nucleic acid testing booths being taken away).
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Over the past few weeks, China’s Covid measures have seen gradual changes, and various places across China have eased local rules regarding nucleic acid testing and the accessibility of public transport and venues. Now, central authorities have announced more measures that basically end the ‘zero Covid’ policy as we knew it. The ‘ten new rules’ became top trending on Weibo.
Just a month ago, on November 11, Chinese central authorities released a set of twenty new rules to “further optimize” China’s approach to Covid.
At the time, Chinese media emphasized that the new rules did not mean that China was letting go of its dynamic Zero Covid policy. Now, another ten new rules have been introduced that do indicate that the country is clearly no longer sticking to its ‘zero Covid’ goals.
After a central meeting that took place on December 6, authorities released a 10-point plan addressing changes in Covid measures. National Health Commission spokesman Mi Feng (米锋) announced the measures during a live-streamed press conference of the Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism of the State Council (#国务院联防联控机制发布会#).
On Wednesday, several hashtags related to the new measures went trending on Chinese social media, including “Health Code” (#健康码#), over 450 million views), and “Ten New Rules” (#新十条#, over 440 million views).
These Are the 10 Changes:
1: Lockdown Changes
Risk areas should be assessed and divided according to science and it should be done precisely. We should no longer see the lockdown of an entire community or residential area; instead, it will be assessed by looking at household units, buildings, and apartment floors. The (temporary) closure of areas will no longer be allowed.
2: Testing Changes
The scope of nucleic acid testing was already limited in the previous adjusted rules, but will now be further limited. Instead of RT-PCR tests, rapid PCR tests will be used more often in accordance with local requirements. Nucleic acid testing will remain in place for high-risk positions and high-risk area personnel in accordance with relevant regulations, and some places including nursing homes, schools, and medical care institutions will still require negative tests, but negative nucleic acid test certificates and health code checks will no longer be necessary for traveling from place to place.
3: Quarantine Changes
People who tested positive but are asymptomatic or only show mild symptoms can isolate at home if they meet local requirements. Centralized isolation centers will still be in operation for more severe cases or those opting in for centralized quarantine. If nucleic acid tests are negative after the fifth day, the isolation period can end.
4: ‘High-Risk Area’ Changes
If no new cases have been detected for five consecutive days, local lockdowns should be lifted.
5: Medicine Availability Changes
Pharmacies should operate normally and cannot be arbitrarily closed. Over-the-counter (OTC) medicines for cough, fever, etc should not be restricted.
6: Vaccination Strategy Changes
The promotion of the Covid vaccination should be stepped up for Chinese seniors, especially in the 60-79 age group, with a clear focus on making sure they get all the vaccinations they need as quickly as possible. In order to boost the vaccination rates, temporary vaccination sites will need to be set up and they will need to be local incentives to get the seniors to vaccinate asap. This was actually also mentioned in the list of twenty optimized Covid measures in November (under rule 12).
7: Medical Classification Clarity
There should be clearer knowledge on the medical status of residents and whether elderly residents have any underlying medical issues and if they have been vaccinated.
8: Focus on the Normal Functioning of Society & Basic Medical Services
If areas are not classified as high-risk areas, people should be allowed to move around freely and have access to basic medical care, and there should be no restrictions on production, work, and business operations.
9: Strengthen Safety Procedures in Epidemic Situations
Buildings [in high-risk areas] cannot block fire exits, unit doors, or community gates under any circumstances. Community management departments should have effective modes of communication systems in place to contact local medical institutions in order to safeguard the medical needs of residents, including seniors living alone, children, pregnant women, and those with underlying conditions.
10: Improved Policies regarding Outbreaks at School Campuses
As also mentioned in the previous updated rules, on-campus epidemic control must be consistent, precise, and in accordance with science. Not only can there be no unnecessarily long lockdowns of campuses, but the risk areas within campuses should be more precisely defined, and normal teaching and living outside these areas should be able to continue as usual. Schools without any outbreaks should carry on normal offline teaching activities, and capus facilities such as supermarkets, cafeterias, libraries, etc. should be open.
Online Responses
One clear online response to China’s recent ‘optimized’ Covid measures is that people are buying a lot of medication, expecting to be infected with Covid soon. Some online stores had already sold out on the Traditional Chinese medicine Lianhua Qingwen (连花清瘟), a herbal pill by Yiling Pharmaceuticals which is used for the treatment of influenza as well as Covid.
Sold-out Lianhua Qingwen pills.
One popular Weibo blogger (@咖啡布偶猫) wrote: “I feel as if the propaganda has seen a sudden change in direction. During the first half of the year and the epidemic in Shanghai, everyone would get scared the moment you talked about a positive case, they wanted to fiercely chase it and thoroughly reach zero cases. Now they are propagating that we should not panic, that we should accept the reality and actively respond to it, as if it is nothing alarming. But we should still pay attention to those with underlying medical conditions, those with respiratory issues, asthma, and lung disease. If you haven’t bought cold medicine yet, do so. Right now, some places even have a limit on buying Lianhua Qingwen.”
During the December 7 press conference, Guo Yanhong (郭燕红), director of the National Health Commission’s health emergency division, emphasized that it is not necessary for people to stock up on medication in light of the announced eased Covid measures and that there are sufficient supplies (#卫健委提示没有必要囤积抢购药物#).
“After being sealed for three years, it’s all lifted in a morning, all the prices go up for Lianhua Qingwen, rapid antigen tests increase in price, and if your symptoms get serious you’re still not able to get help anywhere.”
Some jokingly suggest that after messing around for three years, the pandemic is only now really starting.
“Everyone is really happy now but there’s a black cloud coming our way, we will know in a month or so if it is going to be light drizzle or a heavy rainstorm.”
By Manya Koetse, with contributions by Miranda Barnes
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) this selfie post by a female fitness blogger.
